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ABSTRACT 
 
FEDERAL AND STATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:  ENVIRONMENTAL 
FEDERALISM, STRATEGIC INTERACTION, AND CONSTITUENT INTEREST 
  
BY 
 
BENJAMIN A. CHUPP 
 
August 2009 
 
 Committee Chair:  Dr. H. Spencer Banzhaf 
 Major Department:  Economics 
 Environmental policy in the U.S. is often enacted at both the federal level and the 
state level.  This dissertation uses unique data derived from a combination of a detailed 
simulation model of the U.S. electricity sector and an integrated assessment model of air 
pollution dispersion and valuation to examine three problems in state and federal 
environmental policy.  These data represent the “taxes” (or shadow cost of abatement) on 
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides that are efficient for each state when considering only 
their own costs and benefits, and also the level of federal uniform tax on the same 
pollutants that maximizes each state’s net benefits.  This data is used in three analyses. 
 First, we examine the case of environmental federalism.  Differences in spillovers 
across states, together with differences in population density and local cost structures 
create substantial spatial heterogeneity in the economics of air pollution.  Uniform federal 
control and state level control both have advantages and disadvantages, and it is unclear 
which is more efficient.  For the case of sulfur dioxide (nitrogen oxides), when states 
choose their own level of pollution, 31.5% (76.2%) of the potential benefits under the 
nationally optimal scheme are lost.  The uniform tax only results in a loss of 0.19% 
(2.32%) of the potential benefits.   
 xiv 
 The data derived, which are directly based on the costs and benefits of air 
pollution, provide a broad measure of constituent interest.  These variables are used to 
explain state adoption of green electricity policies and federal legislative voting on 
environmental issues.  In contrast to previous studies, it is found that constituent interest 
and ideology are both important determinants in the formation of environmental policy. 
 Lastly, it is widely known in the literature that states act strategically when 
choosing policies.  This result also persists for state-level environmental stringency.  We 
use unique weighing matrix specifications to distinguish between tax competition and 
competition based on spillover effects.  It is also shown that higher marginal damages of 
pollution limit strategic behavior. 
1 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 Environmental policy in the U.S. is often enacted at both the federal level and the 
state level.  This dissertation uses unique data derived from the combination of a detailed 
simulation model of the U.S. electricity sector and an integrated assessment model of air 
pollution dispersion and valuation to examine three problems in state and federal 
environmental policy.  These data represent a number of different “taxes” (or shadow 
costs of abatement) and abatement levels for efficient sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide 
emissions under various scenarios. 
 First, we examine the case of environmental federalism.  Which level of 
government could regulate air pollution from stationary sources most efficiently?  Air 
pollution from stationary sources is a transboundary problem; pollution in one 
jurisdiction often crosses over into neighboring jurisdictions.  Differences in these 
spillovers across states, together with differences in population density and local cost 
structures create substantial spatial heterogeneity in the economics of air pollution.  
Consequently, the optimal instrument would be fully differentiated across states, 
reflecting the damages each state imposes on themselves and on other states.  However, 
federal policy is usually not differentiated across states because of political constraints.  
On the other hand, policies enacted at the state level would likely ignore the 
interjurisdictional spillovers.  Thus, there is a tradeoff inherent in policymaking (Oates, 
2002).  Chapter 2 of this dissertation determines whether interstate spillovers or 
uniformity is a bigger problem in the case of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions 
from electricity plants.  For the case of sulfur dioxide, when states choose their own level 
of pollution, 31.5% of the potential benefits under the nationally optimal scheme are lost.  
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The uniform policy only results in a loss of 0.19% of the potential benefits.  In the case of 
nitrogen oxides, the state level policies result in a loss of 76.2% of the optimal benefits, 
while the uniform policy causes a loss of 2.32% of the benefits. 
 Secondly, the estimates of states’ benefits from reducing their own pollution and 
upwind pollution fill an important gap in the literature on the political economy of 
environmental policy adoption.  Many articles have attempted to disentangle the effects 
of ideology, party affiliation, and constituent interest on environmental policy adoption 
and legislative voting on environmental issues (e.g., Vachon and Menz 2006; Anderson 
2007).  These papers generally find that ideology is the most important factor in this 
determination.  However, constituent interest is measured in these studies by various 
demographic variables or membership in environmental groups.  Demographic variables 
may not correlate well with true interest, while environmental group membership only 
accounts for those constituents who feel most strongly about the environment, i.e. those 
in the tail of the distribution.  The variables derived, which are directly based on the costs 
and benefits of abating air pollution, provide a broad measure accounting for the state’s 
entire population.  In Chapter 3, these variables are used to explain state adoption of 
green electricity policies and federal legislative voting on environmental issues.  In 
contrast to previous studies (Coates and Munger 1995; Vachon and Menz 2006), we find 
that constituent interest and ideology are both important determinants in the formation of 
environmental policy. 
 Lastly, it is widely known in the literature that states act strategically when 
choosing policies.  This result also persists for state-level environmental stringency.  
However, the literature has been unable to determine whether the strategic interaction is 
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due to tax competition or spillover competition.  Tax competition results when states 
lower environmental standards in an attempt to attract industries to the state (the so-called 
“race to the bottom”).  Spillover competition is when states strategically respond to 
spillovers from other states due to the policy decisions of those states.  Using unique 
weighting matrices, Chapter 4 explores which of the two types of competition is driving 
the strategic interaction in state level environmental stringency.  Additionally the derived 
measure of constituent interest is used to show that high marginal damages of pollution 
limit competitive behavior among the states.  We find that tax competition may account 
for a higher degree of competition than spillover competition, and that higher marginal 
damages limit competitive behavior. 
 This dissertation contributes to the literature in a number of ways.  First, the data 
derived in Chapter 2 are valuable measures of the state-to-state differences in marginal 
damages of pollution and the levels of abatement each state would choose if left to their 
own devices.  The policies studied in Chapter 2 are the most politically feasible policies 
and this work provides an economic measurement of which policy is closer to the 
politically unfeasible optimum.  This research can inform policymakers in the design of 
the scale and scope of tradable permit markets for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide 
emissions.  In addition, Helland and Whitford (2003) call this question of tradeoffs the 
most important unanswered question posed in Oates’ review of environmental federalism 
(2002).   
 In addition to answering the above question in environmental federalism, the data 
derived is useful in a wide range of applications.  It can be used as an ideal measurement 
of constituent interest, as defined by the level that is most beneficial for each state’s 
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constituency.  The data is used in Chapter 3 to analyze how constituent interest affects 
adoption of environmental policies and legislative voting.  In contrast to previous studies, 
we use a measure of constituent interest that has two advantages.  First, it adequately 
measures what is in the best interest of the constituency in terms of aggregate health 
benefits from reduced air pollution.  This measure is more broadly based than previous 
measures, and is broadly compatible with the median voter hypothesis.  Secondly, our 
measure is very closely related to the policies under consideration, and it is shown in 
Chapter 3 that the data carries the most explanatory power in subcategories that are most 
closely linked to the subject matter.  In addition to providing insight into the drivers of 
policy formation, this work shows that constituent interest cannot be loosely defined and 
needs to be tailored to the situation at hand.  The data are also useful as a measure of 
constituent interest in examining whether states consider these health damages when 
competing over environmental policy as in Chapter 4.  These are just some of the 
potential applications of the data that are derived in Chapter 2. 
Historical Background 
 In order to discuss the current research on environmental policy, it is important to 
know how the existing policy framework came into being.  In that spirit, let us consider a 
brief history of air pollution regulation in the United States.  Federal air pollution policy 
was nonexistent prior to the 1950’s.  Before that time, policies were enacted at the state 
and local level to combat pollution.  The earliest legislation took form (predictably) 
following the industrial revolution (Callan and Thomas 2007).  The first federal 
legislation, the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, provided no federal mandates, but 
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simply made federal money available to states in order to conduct their own research and 
programs.   
 More significantly, the Clean Air Act of 1963 set forth emissions standards for 
stationary source emissions and created a committee to study the effects of pollutants 
from mobile sources.  This legislation was quickly followed by the Motor Vehicle Air 
Pollution Control Act of 1965 and the 1965 Clean Air Act Amendments, which allowed 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to set federal standards for 
mobile-source emissions.   
 The 1970 Clean Air Amendments created National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS) for cities and imposed emissions limits for stationary sources and 
mobile sources.  Both programs were set to be implemented through State 
Implementation Plans (SIPs).  New sources were to face stricter standards than older 
sources.  Additional Clean Air Amendments in 1977 provided increased segmentation of 
Air Quality Control Regions (AQCRs) in order to protect regions that were cleaner than 
the NAAQS required.  These regions are called prevention of significant damage (PSD) 
areas.   
 Although this trend in increasing federal control was presumably based on the 
perception that state measures were inadequate, some have argued that it was 
unnecessary, as emissions were rapidly falling under state policies (List and Gerking 
2000; Millimet 2003; Millimet and List 2003; Fomby and Lin 2006).  In 1980, when 
Ronald Reagan became President, he began to transfer some responsibility for 
environmental regulation back to the states.  By 1982, states were responsible for 95% of 
enforcement of national emissions standards for hazardous pollutants and 90% of 
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enforcement of new source performance standards (Millimet and List, 2003).  While 
some theories predict such decentralization would produce a race to the bottom (or a race 
to the top, in some cases) (Markusen, Morey, and Olewiler 1995; Kunce and Shogren 
2002; Kunce and Shogren 2007), empirical analyses of Reagan’s environmental 
federalism policies have found that there was no race to that bottom (List and Gerking 
2000; Millimet 2003; Millimet and List 2003; Fomby and Lin 2006). 
 The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments represent perhaps the most important 
reform in federal air pollution policy to date.  In contrast to all previous legislation, they 
call for market-based policies for sulfur dioxide emissions and stratospheric ozone-
depleting substances.  All previous legislation had relied on command and control (CAC) 
regulation.  The 1990 Amendments were not perfect, however, as even the tradable 
permit schemes are subject to a large degree of federal intervention.   
 Although the Clean Air Act was enacted at the federal level, there are many 
things that states can do beyond the federal legislation.  States can require stationary 
sources to comply with best available control technology (BACT) rather than the 
federally required best available retrofit technology (BART).  In the tradable permits 
markets, states can also retire permits, effectively reducing the total amount of emissions.  
Also, states can implement a number of policies designed to encourage “green” 
electricity generation.  These include renewable portfolio standards, net metering rules, 
generation disclosure rules, and public benefit funds.  These policies are detailed in 
Chapter 3.  The one thing that states cannot do is set their own mobile source emissions 
standards.  Only California has the right to set standards, while other states can adopt the 
standards that California sets. 
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Pollutants and Damages 
 The government defines the most widely harmful pollutants as “criteria 
pollutants.”  As of 2009, there were six criteria pollutants: 
• Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) 
• Carbon Monoxide (CO) 
• Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2) 
• Tropospheric Ozone (O3)1
• Lead 
 
• Particulate Matter (PM10 and PM2.5) 2
In addition to these six criteria pollutants, 188 additional pollutants are classified as 
hazardous air pollutants.  These pollutants may be more harmful than the criteria 
pollutants, but they affect a much smaller proportion of the population.  The NAAQS 
apply to the criteria pollutants, while hazardous air pollutants are covered by the National 
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP).  Table 1 details the 
NAAQS in 2005.  Pollutant concentrations are measured at remote air-monitoring 
stations generally located in urban regions with high pollutant concentrations and large 
populations.  These stations report their data to the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), which aggregates the data and determines which areas are in non-attainment.  
Table 2 summarizes the extent of non-attainment for the various criteria pollutants in 
2004.  Figure 1 shows non-attainment areas for 2007 on a map of the U.S.  
 
                                                 
1 Note the difference between stratospheric ozone, which beneficially blocks ultraviolet 
radiation from the sun, and tropospheric ozone, which is a surface-level pollutant. 
2 PM10 consists of particulate matter with diameter less than 10 micrograms.  PM2.5 
particles have diameter less than 2.5 micrograms. 
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Table 1—National Ambient Air Quality Standards in 2005 
 
Pollutant Standard Value Standard Type3 
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) 
Annual arithmetic mean 0.03 ppm (80 µg/m3) Primary 
24-hour average 0.14 ppm (365 µg/m3) Primary 
3-hour average 0.50 ppm (1300 µg/m3) Secondary 
Carbon Monoxide (CO) 
8-hour average 9 ppm (10 mg/m3) Primary 
1-hour average 35 ppm (40 mg/m3) Primary 
Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2) 
Annual arithmetic mean 0.053 ppm (100 µg/m3) Primary and 
Secondary 
Ozone (O3) 
1-hour average 0.12 ppm (235 µg/m3) Primary and 
Secondary 
8-hour average 0.08 ppm (157 µg/m3) Primary and 
Secondary 
Lead (Pb) 
 1.5 µg/m3  Primary and 
Secondary 
Particulate Matter (PM-10) Particles with diameters of 10 micrometers or less 
Annual arithmetic mean 50 µg/m3  Primary and 
Secondary 
24-hour average 150 µg/m3  Primary and 
Secondary 
Particulate Matter (PM-2.5) Particles with diameters of 2.5 micrometers or less 
Annual arithmetic mean 15 µg/m3  Primary and 
Secondary 
24-hour average 65 µg/m3  Primary and 
Secondary 
Source:  Adapted from Callan and Thomas (2007) 
                                                 
3 Primary NAAQS are intended to protect public health, allowing a margin of safety; 
secondary NAAQS are intended to protect public welfare (includes factors other than 
health, like visibility and agricultural effects). 
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Table 2—Non-attainment Areas in 2004 
Pollutant Number of 
Non-attainment Areas 
Population 
(in thousands) 
Particulate Matter (PM-10) 58 29,187 
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) 17 2,740 
Carbon Monoxide (CO) 9 18,971 
Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2) 0 0 
1-Hour Ozone (O3) 65 111,187 
8-Hour Ozone (O3) 126 159,271 
Lead (Pb) 2 4 
Source:  Adapted from Callan and Thomas (2007). 
 
Figure 1—Non-Attainment Areas in June 2007 
Areas marked in black are designated as non-attainment areas in at least one of the 
criteria pollutants. 
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 The criteria pollutants present a range of potential damages for those who are 
exposed to unsafe levels.  Although the majority of damages are from human health 
effects, there are additional damages to vegetation and the atmosphere.  For example, 
sulfur dioxide converts in the atmosphere into fine particulate matter (PM2.5 and PM10), 
which can cause increases in acute chronic bronchitis and other respiratory problems.  
Exposed populations with previous history of cardiac or respiratory conditions suffer 
from increase mortality.  In addition, sulfur dioxide can also combine with water in the 
atmosphere to produce acid rain.  Table 3 summarizes the various effects of the pollutants 
from stationary sources on people, vegetation, and the atmosphere. 
 PM2.5 is the most damaging pollutant when it comes to human health.  It is the 
main driver of health damages and accounts for the majority of damages in damage-cost 
studies of the electricity sector (Desvouges, Johnson, and Banzhaf 1998; Muller and 
Mendelsohn 2007).  In the Muller and Mendelsohn (2007) study, PM2.5 only accounted 
for 6% of air pollution by weight, but was responsible for 23% of the aggregate damages.  
In addition, pollutants like sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides are converted to PM2.5 in 
the atmosphere, causing damages from SO2 and NOx emissions to be very high as well.  
Muller and Mendelsohn attribute 26% of total damages ($19.5 billion dollars per year) to 
SO2, mainly based on its conversion to fine particulate matter.  Thus, it is important to 
limit sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions based not only on their individual 
damages, but also on their conversion to PM2.5 in the atmosphere. 
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Table 3—Pollutants and their Damages 
Pollutant Effects on Humans Effects on Plants 
Effects on the 
Atmosphere 
Percentage from 
Stationary Sources 
Sulfur Oxides, 
particulates 
Worsens bronchitis 
and other respiratory 
problems.  Causes 
increased mortality 
among patients with 
previous histories of 
cardiac or respiratory 
conditions. 
Diminishes growth 
of plants with 
leaves of high 
physiological 
activity, including 
alfalfa, grains, 
squash, cotton, 
grapes, white pine, 
apple, and endive. 
Particulates in the 
air block radiation 
and may reduce the 
earth’s 
temperature.  
Sulfur oxides 
combine with 
water in the air to 
produce sulfuric 
acid, which reduces 
visibility and forms 
corrosive acid rain. 
68% (SO2) 
Carbon 
Dioxide 
- - Carbon dioxide 
traps heat in the 
atmosphere and 
causes global 
climate change. 
40% 
Mercury Chronic exposure 
causes tremors, 
cognitive 
impairment, and 
sleep problems.  
Mercury emissions 
build up in fish and 
cause birth defects. 
- - 40% 
Nitrogen 
Oxides 
Causes respiratory 
tract and lung 
infections and eye 
and nose irritation.  
Converts to 
particulate matter in 
the atmosphere. 
Restricts plant 
growth.  Forms 
acid rain, which 
kills trees. 
NO2 reduces 
visibility.  NOx 
forms acid rain, 
killing trees and 
acidifying lakes, 
killing fish.  NOx 
in the upper 
atmosphere 
depletes ozone, 
causing increased 
ultraviolet levels.   
22% 
 
Adapted from Stutz (1996), Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih (2007) 
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Stationary Source Emissions 
 
 Stationary sources, including electricity-generating plants, emit the majority of 
the annual sulfur dioxide emissions in the U.S.  This sulfur dioxide is converted in the 
atmosphere into sulfates, which are a main component of fine particulate matter, which is 
the most harmful pollutant to health as mentioned above.  Sulfur dioxide also causes acid 
rain.  Stationary sources are responsible for much of the emissions in the United States.  
Roughly 68% of sulfur dioxide emissions and 22% of nitrogen dioxide emissions come 
from electricity plants (Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 2007).  Additionally, electricity plants 
release 40% of the nation’s carbon dioxide and 40% of mercury. 
 The traditional way to control stationary source emissions was to implement 
uniform technology-based standards, a command-and-control strategy.  Differing 
standards apply to new and old sources.  New sources are required to submit to stricter 
regulations called New Source Performance Standards (NSPS).  The EPA controls these 
regulations for new sources, while the states control the standards for existing sources.  
Policies are also differentiated by whether or not the area is in attainment.  For prevention 
of significant damage (PSD) areas, new or modified sources must comply with the best 
available control technology (BACT), while existing facilities must install the best 
available retrofit technology (BART).  In non-attainment areas, new or modified sources 
must meet the lowest achievable emissions rate (LAER), while existing sources must use 
reasonably available control technology (RACT). 
 In contrast to these command and control policies, some pollutants are controlled 
by market-based instruments.  Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) 
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created a sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade system.  The law established a cap of 9.5 million 
tons of SO2 annually for the electricity sector starting in 2000 (Phase II), with the cap 
decreasing to 8.95 million tons beginning in 2010.  These caps were further reduced by 
the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) in 2005.  When fully implemented, CAIR mandates 
reductions of sulfur dioxide emissions of 70% and nitrogen oxide emissions of 60%.4
 Similar programs exist for nitrogen oxide emissions.  Previously, NOx emissions 
had been under the control of state implementation plans (SIP’s).  However, recent 
regulation, called the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) has been created to impose a 
market-based mechanism on the emissions of these pollutants. 
  In 
order to limit emissions to the cap level, the EPA issues tradable permits to firms 
allowing them to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide for each permit that they own.  If a firm 
does not use all of their permits, they are allowed to sell their permits on the tradable 
permits market.  Firms that do not have enough permits are allowed to buy permits in the 
market in order to emit more sulfur dioxide.  By setting the cap at the efficient level, the 
tradable permit scheme generates the same outcome as a Pigouvian tax on emissions.  
However, the most important difference is the allocation of rents.  Under the Pigouvian 
tax, the government collects the tax revenue.  Under a tradable permit scheme, the rent 
accumulates to the firms who are allocated permits.   
 Now that the institutional framework has been discussed, the rest of the work can 
be presented.  Chapter 2 contains the analysis of environmental federalism, while Chapter 
3 uses the data as constituent interest variables in the analyses of green electricity policies 
                                                 
4 CAIR has been subject to a number of legal challenges.  On July 11, 2008, the Supreme 
Court remanded the rule.  This was followed by a December 23, 2008 ruling allowing the 
rule to remain in place until a suitable revision could be written. 
14 
 
 
and legislative voting.  Chapter 4 expounds the strategic interaction analysis.  Chapter 5 
concludes.
15 
CHAPTER 2:  ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 
Environmental federalism, like other forms of federalism, refers to a transfer of 
responsibility to subnational governments.  However, in the case of environmental 
federalism, two main problems arise.  First, states are likely to ignore interstate 
spillovers.  Secondly, states may lower their environmental standards in an attempt to 
attract industries to the state.  On the other hand, state policies can account for geographic 
heterogeneity in damages, while, for political reasons, federal policies generally do not 
do so.  The optimal solution involves a fully differentiated system where each state is 
responsible for all damages that spill over into other jurisdictions.  With both federal and 
state level policies suffering from potential drawbacks, it is natural to question which of 
the two policies is closer to the fully differentiated solution.  Helland and Whitford 
(2003) call this the most important question posed in Oates’ (2002) review of 
environmental federalism. 
Using a detailed simulation model of the U.S. electricity sector and an integrated 
assessment model of pollution damages, this study will determine the cap on sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) pollution that a welfare-maximizing state would 
impose upon itself along with the per-unit “tax” (marginal abatement costs)5
                                                 
5 I will use the term “tax” as convenient shorthand.  However, the broader interpretation 
of this term is the shadow value of emissions to industry or the marginal cost of 
abatement. 
 on 
emissions that would generate that level.  Then, these state levels are compared to the 
first-best case where “taxes” are fully differentiated across states and the nationally 
efficient uniform tax.  The benefits of a national uniform tax (or shadow price) are 
similarly compared to the first-best case. 
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Implicit in this discussion is the hypothesis that states will ignore benefits or 
damages that accrue outside of their own borders when making abatement decisions.  
Empirical evidence seems to confirm this hypothesis.  Sigman (2005) finds evidence that 
states ignore interstate spillovers in the case of water pollution.  Helland and Whitford 
(2003) find that plants located in border counties (counties which border another state) 
emit more pollution than those that are entirely interior, suggesting that states are less 
environmentally stringent when pollution is more likely to travel out of state. 
In the literature on environmental federalism, much attention has been paid to the 
theory that states will lower environmental standards to attract industry.  Many 
theoretical papers focus on this potential “race to the bottom,” with some supporting the 
conclusion, and other refuting it (Oates and Schwab 1988; Wellisch 1995; Markusen, 
Morey, and Olewiler 1995; Levinson 1997; Kunce and Shogren 2002, 2005, 2007; Glazer 
1999; Djikstra 2003; Kunce 2004; Roelfsema 2007).   
Other empirical work on the issue has found that the level of governance has little 
effect on pollution outcomes (e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1995).  List and Gerking (2000) find 
no evidence that Reagan’s implementation of “New Federalism,” with its significant 
transfer of responsibility to state governments, had a negative effect on aggregate 
emissions.  These results are duplicated in similar analyses by Millimet (2003), Millimet 
and List (2003), and Fomby and Lin (2006).  Sigman (2007) finds that nations with 
decentralized governments correspond with higher levels of pollution internationally, but 
the effect is mild.   
 Dinan, Cropper, and Portney (1999) examine the case of public drinking water 
quality, which is almost surely a local public good with little or no spillover effects.  In 
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this case, as discussed in Oates (2002), it is most efficient for regulation to be undertaken 
at the subnational level, since each subnational government will be able to (and has 
incentive to) mandate the efficient level.  Since there are economies of scale in the 
reduction of pollutants in drinking water, small systems will undoubtedly have a higher 
cost of cleaning (per-capita) and will therefore have a lower efficient level of abatement.  
The authors measure the change in the number of cancer cases as a benefit, intentionally 
assuming the worst-case scenario for cancer-causing isotopes.  They do this in order to 
provide an upper bound on benefits, which will, in turn, provide a lower bound on 
welfare losses.  On the cost side, they assume that jurisdictions remove only enough 
pollutant to reach the limit, and that they use the cheapest available technology.  They 
find that some households may lose up to $774 dollars per year from requiring the 
blanket regulation vs. allowing each system to choose their own optimum.  Thus, federal 
uniform legislation is less efficient than local control in this situation.  This chapter 
examines the same problem in the context of air pollution. 
Data 
 We follow the approach of Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer (2004), who use the 
Haiku model developed by Resources for the Future to analyze costs of abatement of SO2 
and NOx in the electricity sector.  The Haiku model is a detailed simulation model of the 
continental U.S. electricity industry.  The model determines the market equilibrium 
resulting from regional electricity demand curves and endogenously determined supply 
curves.  The Haiku model allows the user to input a per-unit tax on a pollutant and 
observe what the resultant level of pollution would be relative to the baseline.  By 
inputting several levels of “taxes” (or, more generally, the marginal abatement costs 
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induced by any incentive-based instrument), one can construct a curve that can represent 
the industry’s marginal cost of abatement.   
 We also use the Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF) integrated assessment 
model to analyze the benefits of pollution abatement.  TAF includes spillover matrices 
that determine how much pollution spills over from each state to each other state.  TAF 
also includes measures of health benefits for reductions in each pollutant.  Plotting the 
results of the model for several levels of pollution abatement results in a curve 
representing the marginal benefits of pollution abatement.   
 Given marginal cost and marginal benefit curves, Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
(2004)  proceed to find the optimal level of pollution and the optimal uniform tax for the 
entire U.S.  However, the data generated by each model is broken down by state.  Thus, 
the data can be used to find the optimal abatement and tax for each state that would result 
if states could set their own taxes.  Additionally, one can use the data to determine which 
national uniform tax level generates the most benefits for each state.  Before discussing 
these procedures, let us consider each model in more detail. 
Haiku 
The Haiku model was developed at Resources for the Future by Dallas Burtraw, 
Ranjit Bharvirkar, David Evans, Karen Palmer, Anthony Paul, and others (Paul and 
Burtraw 2002).  It has been used in a multitude of peer-reviewed articles (Palmer and 
Burtraw 2005; Burtraw, Kahn, and Palmer 2006; Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 2007).  In 
essence, the model is a simulation of regional electricity markets along with interregional 
electricity trade in the United States.  Haiku is very versatile, being able to simulate 
changes in the electricity market arising from many forms of public policy, including 
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environmental legislation and market competition legislation.  Haiku accomplishes this 
by calculating market equilibria in 13 National Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) 
subregions.  
The demand side of the market is the aggregate of three sectoral electricity 
demand functions (commercial, industrial, and residential).  The supply side is based on 
64 model plants types, into which are mapped all actual plants in the continental U.S.  
The model plants differ by six fields:  plant technology, fuel type, coal demand region, 
SO2 scrubbers, relative efficiency, and existence status.  Individual plants also differ by 
age.  The model accounts for developments in wind, solar, and hydroelectric power.  
Electricity supply is also a function of endogenous fuel prices for each fuel type. 
Haiku divides the year into 3 seasons to capture seasonal variation in electricity 
demand:  winter, summer, and spring/fall.  Within seasons, time is subdivided into three 
time blocks accounting for variations in demand, from low to peak periods.  Electricity 
markets clear in all 117 markets (13 regions x 3 seasons x 3 time blocks) based on 
marginal or average cost pricing as appropriate.   
Haiku acknowledges that power plants are very long-term investments, and to 
reflect this, the model solves for a 20-year time horizon, discounting future revenues and 
costs back to the decision-making point.  The model does not solve for every year, 
however.  It solves for every fifth year and interpolates the results to intermediate years.   
Haiku’s data mainly comes from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee (FERC), with some additional information 
from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  The demand elasticities assumed in 
the model are primarily collected from academic literature. 
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The main feature of Haiku that is useful for our purposes is its ability to simulate 
emissions taxes.  The model incorporates the tax as an increased cost of emitting the 
pollutant.  Thus, by instituting a range of emissions taxes and solving the model for each 
tax, one retrieves the pollution abatement from each level of taxation.  This can be used 
to construct a marginal cost of abatement curve.  Since prices and quantities are duals, the 
“tax” level used as an input in Haiku is also interpretable as the marginal cost of 
abatement when emissions are capped at the associated pollution level. 
While Haiku solves for an extended time horizon and many years, we only 
consider the projected emissions for the year 2010.  Consequently, it is important to note 
that our data are based on a static short-run equilibrium rather than a dynamic 
equilibrium.   
Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF) 
 Integrated assessment models bring together contributions from many different 
areas of science.  Models may combine information from any number of scientific 
sources, including, but not limited to, meteorology, ecology, biology, medicine, 
chemistry, and economics.  All of the information works together allowing one model to 
compute all of the relevant effects together. 
 Integrated assessment models make extensive use of transfer methods, which are 
the transfer of research from one study to another, taking account of the circumstances of 
the new context (Desvousges, Johnson, and Banzhaf 1998; Navrud and Ready 2007).  
There are many times when designing and executing an entirely new study is not a 
worthwhile endeavor.  In these cases, it may be feasible to assimilate information from a 
previous reliable study.   
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 Several integrated assessment models have been developed in recent years.  
Desvousges, Johnson, and Banzhaf (1998) develop an integrated assessment model of air 
pollution in order to study new power plant locations in Minnesota.  Rowe, Lang, and 
Chestnut (1996) use the New York State Environmental Externalities Cost Study and 
computerized externality model (EXMOD) to measure externalities from electricity 
production in New York.  Muller and Mendelsohn (2007) use an integrated assessment 
model of air pollution called the Air Pollution Emissions Experiments and Policy analysis 
model (APEEP) to examine the marginal damages of releasing one additional ton of 
emissions from any of 10,000 sources.  They use these marginal damages to calculate 
gross aggregate damages.  The EPA uses a model called BENMAP to estimate, value, 
and graphically display increases in air pollution.  In addition to air pollution, integrated 
assessment models have been used to study climate change (Kelly and Kolstad 2000; 
Schellnhuber et al. 2004; Haurie and Viguier 2005). 
 The Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF) is a peer-reviewed integrated 
assessment model that serves to collect models of pollution transportation and deposition, 
human health effects from pollution, and the valuation of these effects (Bloyd et al. 
1996).  TAF consists of several modules, each of which was developed by a team of 
experts in their respective field.  Here, the analysis is limited to health effects, which 
account for the vast majority of benefits in these integrated assessment models (Krupnick 
and Burtraw 1996; Rowe, Lang, and Chestnut 1996; Desvousges, Johnson, and Banzhaf 
1998; Muller and Mendelsohn 2007). 
 Perhaps the most important features of TAF are the seasonal source-receptor 
matrices, which track pollutants from their source to the locations that they damage.  The 
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source-receptor matrices in TAF are simplified versions of the Advanced Source 
Trajectory Regional Air Pollution model (ASTRAP), which is based on 11 years of 
weather data.  TAF identifies a source centroid and a receptor centroid for each state 
based on electricity generation patterns and population respectively.  These centroids are 
used to compute reduced form source-receptor matrices of state-to-state pollution flows.   
 Health effects in the TAF model consist of changes in health status that result 
from increased air pollution as computed from estimated epidemiological relationships.  
Effects are summarized in a number of ways:  as statistical lives lost, days of acute 
morbidity of various types, and number of chronic disease cases (such as asthma and 
emphysema).  TAF then assigns monetary values to these damages based on academic 
studies.  Most importantly, the value of a statistical life in TAF is taken from a meta-
analysis by Mrozek and Taylor (2002)  and equals $2.32 million (in 2000 dollars).  This 
value is on the low end of the low end of the range in the literature, and compares to the 
value of $6.11 million (in 2000 dollars) used by the EPA in its benefit-cost analyses.  
Values for short-term morbidity effects are taken from a meta-analysis by Johnson, Fries, 
and Banzhaf (1997).  The values used in TAF for various health effects are summarized 
in Table 4. 
 TAF takes a baseline emissions scenario and a policy emissions scenario to 
calculate the total yearly benefits of the emissions reduction by state.  These numbers can 
be divided by the abated emissions to get average benefits per ton. 
Methodology 
 The points that Haiku generates are graphed in order to represent the marginal 
cost of abatement.  The tax levels and corresponding emissions should construct an  
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Table 4—Monetary Values of Health Incidents from TAF 
Health Problem Value per Case 
(2000 dollars) 
Phlegm Day $3.52 
Eye Irritation Day $3.52 
Adult Chronic Bronchitis (PM) $8,990.89 
Adult Chronic Bronchitis (Sulfate) $256,995.26 
Respiratory Hospital Admissions (PM) $8,733.37 
Respiratory Hospital Admissions (Sulfate) $16,226.44 
Cardiac Hospital Admissions $16,226.44 
Asthma Attack $40.73 
Restricted Activity Day (PM) $70.63 
Restricted Activity Day (Sulfate) $69.52 
Lower Respiratory Symptoms $12.75 
Croup $5.70 
Acute Cough $4.88 
Adult Chest Discomfort $11.08 
Emergency Room Visit $246.48 
Acute Respiratory Symptoms $3.65 
Chronic Cough $2,929.96 
Child Chronic Bronchitis $182.76 
Acute Bronchitis $5.48 
Upper Respiratory Symptoms $3.69 
Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) $2,317,687.31 
  All values are per case or per day if noted.
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upward-sloping marginal cost of abatement (MCA) curve for each state’s emissions.  
Taxes vary from $500 per ton of sulfur dioxide up to $6,500 per ton.  For NOx, the taxes 
range from $700 to $1500 per ton. 
 Data from Haiku on each state’s emissions are inputted into TAF to define the 
marginal benefit curves.  By varying one state’s emissions and leaving all other states at 
their baseline levels and looking at the change in total damages, we can construct 
marginal benefit curves for the damages a state imposes upon itself and the total damages 
aggregated over all states in the analysis.  The epidemiological literature suggests that the 
effects are virtually constant.  Hence, TAF uses constant damage estimates according to 
the state where the damage occurs, and the curves that result are horizontal lines 
corresponding to the damages inflicted by each ton of sulfur dioxide emitted. 
 The information that is observed from the Haiku and TAF models is a series of 
points corresponding to the hypothetical emissions taxes inputted into the model.  
However, the Haiku data are rather noisy, reflecting a myriad of reasons that emissions 
vary.  We wish to obtain smooth lines connecting the points provided by Haiku.  One 
way to do this is to use the locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (Lowess) method 
introduced by Cleveland (1979).  This is a variant of the local polynomial estimation that 
uses a variable bandwidth parameter determined by the distance from each point to its 
nearest neighbors.  It uses a tricubic kernel and downweights observations with larger 
than normal residuals.  Lowess is considered superior to standard kernel regression in that 
it uses a variable bandwidth and is robust to outliers. 
 Intuitively, the process estimates a linear regression for each point based on the 
nearest neighbors as determined by the bandwidth.  Then, it uses the results of the 
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regression to predict the value at each level.  Then, these predicted values are connected 
by linear segments to form the smoothed piecewise linear curves.6
 Figures 5-7 show fully constructed graphs with (smoothed) costs and benefits for 
three states:  Kansas, North Carolina, and California.  The upward-sloping- line is the 
MCA curve.  The lower dashed line represents the marginal benefits accruing only within 
each respective state from its own abatement.  The upper dashed line represents the 
benefits for the entire nation that result from abatement in each respective state.  By 
finding the intersection points, the equilibria are revealed.  The intersection of the MCA 
curve and the lower dashed line represents the level of abatement that would result if the 
state only cared about its own benefits.  The intersection with the upper dashed line 
represents the nationally optimal level of abatement in each state.  When aggregated, the 
equilibria from each state’s graphs represent the total level of abatement for the country 
under the various scenarios.   
  Figure 2 shows an 
example of an unsmoothed and smoothed MCA curve for Connecticut (SO2).  The jagged 
line is the unsmoothed data, while the other line has been smoothed with the Lowess 
process.  The unsmoothed data is full of reversals, which do not comply with economic 
theory.  The reversals are due to small amounts of interregional trade in electricity and 
simulation error in solving the Haiku model.  The graph shows one of the worst cases, as 
Connecticut is a small state.  More typical cases are shown in Figure 3 for New York and 
Figure 4 for Texas.   
                                                 
6 Any reversals still present after smoothing are eliminated by removing the point prior to 
the reversal and all subsequent points until a higher level of abatement is achieved.  Then, 
a line segment connects the points on either side of the gap.  This occurs in only four 
cases. 
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Figure 2—Raw and Smoothed MCA Curves for Connecticut 
 
The dashed line represents the raw, unsmoothed Haiku data, while the solid 
line reflects application of the Lowess smoother. 
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Figure 3—Raw and Smoothed MCA Curves for New York 
 
The dashed line represents the raw, unsmoothed Haiku data, while the solid 
line reflects application of the Lowess smoother. 
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Figure 4—Raw and Smoothed MCA Curves for Texas 
 
The dashed line represents the raw, unsmoothed Haiku data, while the solid 
line reflects application of the Lowess smoother. 
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Figure 5—MCA and MB for Sulfur Dioxide for Kansas 
 
The solid line represents the marginal cost of abatement curve.  The upper 
dashed line represents the marginal benefits that accrue to the entire nation 
based on Kansas’ abatement of sulfur dioxide (SO2), while the lower dashed 
line represents the benefits that accrue only within the state of Kansas. 
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Figure 6—MCA and MB for Sulfur Dioxide for North Carolina 
 
 
The solid line represents the marginal cost of abatement curve.  The upper 
dashed line represents the marginal benefits that accrue to the entire nation 
based on North Carolina’s abatement of sulfur dioxide (SO2), while the lower 
dashed line represents the benefits that accrue only within the state of North 
Carolina. 
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Figure 7—MCA and MB for Sulfur Dioxide for California 
 
 
The solid line represents the marginal cost of abatement curve.  The upper 
dashed line represents the marginal benefits that accrue to the entire nation 
based on California’s abatement of sulfur dioxide (SO2), while the lower 
dashed line represents the benefits that accrue only within the state of 
California. 
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Finally, we must calculate the nationally optimal uniform “tax” and abatement.  
This requires aggregating the marginal cost curves to a national marginal cost of 
abatement curve.  Benefits are no longer constant, as differing marginal abatement will 
occur at different locations with differing damages.  However, there is no consistent trend 
in benefits and smoothing results in a roughly horizontal line.  For SO2, we calculate the 
optimal uniform tax to be $3,912 (shown in Figure 8).  For NOx, the uniform tax is 
$622.50 (as seen in Figure 9).7
 This data can now be used to answer the questions that we set out to answer.  By 
aggregating the state emissions under each scenario, the total levels of emissions (and 
their monetary values) can be compared to see how emissions differ when states pick 
their own levels of emissions. 
 
Results 
 The individually optimal state taxes, the nationally optimal taxes, and their 
respective levels of abatement for SO2 are presented in Table 5.8
                                                 
7 These estimates are slightly different than those in Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
(2004).  That paper had an inconsistency insofar as ancillary benefits of NOx reductions 
from SO2 "taxes" (or vice versa) were included in the net benefit function, but general 
equilibrium shifts in abatement cost curves were ignored.  My partial equilibrium 
approach is more straight-forward and more consistent.  Sensitivity analyses suggest this 
would not qualitatively affect the results found here. 
  Table 5 shows the 
marginal benefits and optimal abatement (in tons of SO2) under the state level policy, the 
national uniform policy, and the fully differentiated first best policy.  The first column 
shows the “tax” that would induce the level of abatement shown in the third column.   
8    The District of Columbia, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Idaho are excluded from the 
analysis.  The first three do not contribute any significant level of emissions, while Idaho 
does not emit any sulfur dioxide and barely any nitrogen oxides in any specification.  
Benefits accruing to these states from other state’s emissions are included in those state’s 
calculations. 
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Figure 8—National Uniform SO2 Policy 
 
The dashed line represents the national marginal benefit (MB) curve for sulfur 
dioxide abatement.  Notice that, unlike the state MB curves, this curve is not 
horizontal.  State-specific marginal damages are constant, but since different 
states abate at different points in the range of abatement, the national MB 
curve is not constant.  This line has been smoothed with the Lowess smoother.  
The solid line represents the national MCA curve.  The point of intersection 
determines the efficient national uniform “tax”, which is $3,912 per ton of 
sulfur dioxide. 
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Figure 9—National Uniform NOx Policy 
 
The dashed line represents the national marginal benefit (MB) curve for 
nitrogen oxide (NOx) abatement.  Notice that, unlike the state MB curves, this 
curve is not horizontal.  State-specific marginal damages are constant, but 
since different states abate at different points in the range of abatement, the 
national MB curve is not constant.  This line has been smoothed with the 
Lowess smoother.  The solid line represents the national MCA curve.  The 
point of intersection determines the efficient national uniform “tax”, which is 
$622.50 per ton of nitrogen oxides. 
35 
 
 
Table 5—Taxes and Abatement for SO2 
  
State Level 
“Tax” 
First Best 
Tax 
State Level 
Abatement 
First Best 
Abatement 
Uniform Tax9
State Abatement 
as a % of First 
Best 
 
Abatement 
Uniform Tax 
Abatement as a 
% of First Best 
AL $343.58 $4,133.10 8334.8 283160 283160.4 2.94% 100.00% 
AZ $247.80 $1,707.51 1087.7 7465.8 13555.05 14.57% 181.56% 
AR $375.59 $4,637.93 158670 334470 333959.3 47.44% 99.85% 
CA $4,975.46 $6,199.27 7127.3 7149.8 7166.879 99.69% 100.24% 
CO $291.53 $1,632.33 6061.4 44902 69039.04 13.50% 153.75% 
CT $1,060.46 $3,739.77 7224.8 11353 11259.71 63.64% 99.18% 
DE $81.56 $2,526.79 19444 146720 148458.4 13.25% 101.18% 
FL $1,240.30 $3,528.00 257900 389960 389953.7 66.13% 100.00% 
GA $482.79 $3,825.17 445870 902190 902171.9 49.42% 100.00% 
IL $837.04 $4,428.95 1664600 2107100 2107099 79.00% 100.00% 
IN $435.29 $4,271.14 978530 1478700 1476633 66.18% 99.86% 
IA $139.51 $3,184.11 1799.5 34705 37136.59 5.19% 107.01% 
KS $113.87 $2,943.90 616.25 54528 55786.02 1.13% 102.31% 
KY $307.69 $4,362.10 74165 403580 403803.2 18.38% 100.06% 
LA $657.81 $4,122.66 140300 208060 207808.7 67.43% 99.88% 
ME $302.32 $1,091.30 1262.6 2605.3 4037.399 48.46% 154.97% 
MD $654.99 $3,874.41 605860 736320 736188.2 82.28% 99.98% 
MA $1,063.06 $2,304.91 6568.2 10954 12122.31 59.96% 110.67% 
MI $534.50 $3,580.13 1050300 1352700 1353118 77.64% 100.03% 
MN $399.84 $2,973.92 727.35 12275 14245.81 5.93% 116.06% 
MS $293.67 $3,893.92 1089.9 46223 46222.98 2.36% 100.00% 
MO $260.87 $3,682.91 26545 376200 376008.8 7.06% 99.95% 
MT $52.39 $1,104.10 31.026 924.62 5966.1 3.36% 645.25% 
NE $52.60 $1,584.08 382.27 10996 20290.7 3.48% 184.53% 
NV $126.13 $2,389.29 4054.3 104360 111395.4 3.88% 106.74% 
NH $134.77 $1,474.36 225.96 7487.8 12846.39 3.02% 171.56% 
NJ $2,297.02 $4,922.04 81956 94464 92428.47 86.76% 97.85% 
NM $99.16 $1,633.95 84.195 933.88 1448.964 9.02% 155.16% 
NY $1,249.50 $3,889.20 149600 205350 203749.7 72.85% 99.22% 
NC $1,071.42 $4,753.78 1537000 1842500 1789921 83.42% 97.15% 
ND $19.34 $1,109.55 16.703 958.21 6674.862 1.74% 696.60% 
OH $549.61 $3,874.56 491990 1055500 1043603 46.61% 98.87% 
OK $261.44 $3,455.63 130680 412000 412091 31.72% 100.02% 
OR $621.09 $3,196.00 802.22 11456 11882.51 7.00% 103.72% 
PA $859.59 $3,843.79 388580 703080 698024.4 55.27% 99.28% 
SC $462.80 $3,529.74 434380 582110 581632.2 74.62% 99.92% 
SD $28.87 $1,414.55 38.331 1884.9 3858.676 2.03% 204.72% 
TN $383.81 $4,393.99 57789 306270 306326.5 18.87% 100.02% 
TX $628.08 $3,194.46 606090 921870 927067.9 65.75% 100.56% 
UT $236.24 $1,648.95 481.14 9093.2 20527.72 5.29% 225.75% 
VA $1,040.73 $4,929.50 538930 642740 629965.3 83.85% 98.01% 
WA $731.53 $1,726.98 2550.6 16900 32015.49 15.09% 189.44% 
WV $101.57 $3,691.71 283930 1691100 1691029 16.79% 100.00% 
WI $373.50 $3,436.60 538100 943180 943228.56 57.05% 100.01% 
WY $26.08 $1,286.52 143.83 9405.9 25394.4 1.53% 269.98% 
 Total     10711919.4 18525885.4 18560302.6 57.82% 100.19% 
All abatement measures are in tons of sulfur dioxide abated from the baseline.  The first two columns show the value of the state-level 
and optimal “taxes” while the next three columns show state abatement under the three different policies.  The final two columns show 
the state policy and uniform policy abatement as a percentage of the optimal abatement.
                                                 
9 The nationally uniform tax is $3,912 per ton of SO2. 
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Thus, the number in the first column represents the benefit accruing to each state from the 
abatement of one additional ton of sulfur dioxide.  The third column gives the 
equilibrium quantity of abatement that each state should choose given the marginal 
benefit estimates from the first column.  These two columns are for the state level policy.  
Columns 2 and 4 show the same information for the fully differentiated first best optimal 
policy.  The fifth column shows abatement under the nationally optimal uniform “tax.”  
The last two columns show the state level and uniform tax abatement levels as a 
percentage of each state’s first best optimal abatement.  Note that all abatement is relative 
to the baseline emissions.10
 Two trends emerge when looking at the results.  First, larger states, like 
California, tend to have higher state-optimal “taxes” compared to smaller states.  
California and Texas would select higher levels of abatement than would smaller states 
with the same population density.  Since emissions in these states have farther to go  
  Table 6 shows the net benefits (total benefits – total costs) 
for each state and each policy.  The total benefits of each policy are calculated by 
multiplying abatement by the optimal policy marginal benefits.  Costs, as measured by 
the area under the marginal abatement curve up to the abatement level, are subtracted 
from the total benefits to get net benefits.  Column 1 shows the national net benefits 
achieved when a state acts in its own interests.  Column 2 shows a state’s contribution to 
national benefits when it behaves optimally, and Column 3 shows a state’s contribution 
when it complies with a national uniform policy.  Tables 7 and 8 show the same 
information for NOx taxes, abatement, and net benefits. 
                                                 
10 The baseline for the SO2 model assumes the nationally optimal NOx tax of $900 per ton 
as derived in Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer (2004), but there are no policies in effect for 
SO2.  Similarly, the NOx baseline includes a $3,000 per ton SO2 tax and no policies for 
NOx. 
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Table 6—Net Benefits of SO2 
  State Net Benefits11 Optimal Net Benefits  
Uniform Tax Net 
Benefits 
AL $33,016,753 $661,028,298 $661,028,298 
AZ $1,722,498 $6,391,725 $573,964 
AR $706,103,362 $1,305,728,466 $1,305,634,156 
CA $34,483,447 $34,485,744 $34,477,369 
CO $9,010,639 $31,005,685 $21,002,010 
CT $24,492,181 $31,380,594 $31,375,460 
DE $48,338,057 $303,794,021 $303,106,444 
FL $803,722,133 $996,720,290 $996,701,970 
GA $1,597,896,943 $2,602,325,127 $2,602,331,630 
IL $6,921,572,918 $8,073,744,024 $8,073,744,024 
IN $3,966,470,718 $5,374,877,882 $5,374,810,768 
IA $5,604,278 $60,972,390 $58,279,284 
KS $1,779,092 $88,499,986 $87,853,729 
KY $312,105,142 $1,308,859,577 $1,308,855,956 
LA $541,137,044 $713,810,411 $713,789,372 
ME $1,187,025 $1,909,834 $381,291 
MD $2,191,571,450 $2,497,197,282 $2,497,213,514 
MA $12,215,991 $15,238,952 $14,500,879 
MI $3,496,625,444 $4,011,629,201 $4,011,731,564 
MN $2,017,672 $16,127,884 $14,128,508 
MS $4,083,957 $96,555,836 $96,555,836 
MO $94,300,466 $918,321,033 $918,312,248 
MT $33,443 $375,060 -$4,057,525 
NE $595,494 $8,876,294 -$4,260,891 
NV $9,431,228 $118,046,805 $115,377,440 
NH $317,921 $4,387,117 $1,678,970 
NJ $341,020,573 $365,267,429 $364,535,077 
NM $133,396 $877,975 $547,414 
NY $519,436,239 $628,597,109 $628,568,301 
NC $6,896,616,405 $7,545,447,495 $7,532,570,699 
ND $18,371 $531,592 -$9,102,678 
OH $1,780,222,678 $2,923,193,583 $2,922,867,427 
OK $434,499,547 $1,093,557,983 $1,093,469,228 
OR $2,314,769 $17,618,432 $17,177,875 
PA $1,370,518,302 $1,979,018,950 $1,978,933,386 
SC $1,432,739,626 $1,706,878,513 $1,705,129,316 
SD $53,668 $1,334,581 -$1,264,515 
TN $242,834,499 $947,151,775 $947,139,955 
TX $1,777,032,495 $2,293,320,237 $2,292,121,469 
UT $736,544 $4,648,263 -$2,774,690 
VA $2,508,986,398 $2,774,857,978 $2,770,717,810 
WA $3,471,904 $9,202,889 -$4,757,596 
WV $1,033,766,266 $5,462,105,096 $5,462,272,608 
WI $1,748,745,698 $2,695,094,557 $2,694,695,095 
WY $183,164 $4,894,636 -$6,031,187 
 Totals $40,913,165,839 $59,735,888,591 $59,621,941,265 
 Difference from 
Optimal NB 
$18,822,722,751 
(31.5%)   
$113,947,326 
 (0.19%) 
                                                 
11 Net benefits presented here are the nation-wide benefits of reduced pollution in the 
given state minus the state’s costs of attaining that level of pollution. 
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Table 7—Taxes and Abatement for NOx 
  
State Level 
“Tax” 
First Best 
Tax 
State Level 
Abatement 
First Best 
Abatement 
Uniform 
Tax12
State Abatement 
as a % of First 
Best 
 
Abatement 
Uniform Tax 
Abatement as a 
% of First Best 
AL $60.27 $679.71 10879 123000 112000 8.84% 91.06% 
AZ $62.85 $323.42 66.079 340.04 654.48 19.43% 192.47% 
AR $38.07 $649.78 486.39 8302.5 7953.9 5.86% 95.80% 
CA $348.10 $475.30 708.14 966.88 1266.3 73.24% 130.97% 
CO $42.06 $306.38 97.34 709.05 1440.6 13.73% 203.17% 
CT $101.62 $500.60 29.878 147.19 183.03 20.30% 124.35% 
DE $13.52 $472.44 251.41 8783.1 11573 2.86% 131.76% 
FL $223.88 $524.38 26662 62448 74133 42.69% 118.71% 
GA $105.84 $673.81 23220 148000 137000 15.69% 92.57% 
IL $136.11 $744.45 54964 286000 251000 19.22% 87.76% 
IN $77.91 $774.49 24464 243000 195000 10.07% 80.25% 
IA $33.96 $591.34 1765 30735 32354 5.74% 105.27% 
KS $21.71 $461.21 1634.6 34722 46865 4.71% 134.97% 
KY $52.62 $778.82 16963 226000 201000 7.51% 88.94% 
LA $73.80 $561.33 3322.3 25268 28022 13.15% 110.90% 
ME $20.53 $153.64 2.3352 17.479 70.819 13.36% 405.17% 
MD $120.99 $719.06 11363 65778 58464 17.27% 88.88% 
MA $135.83 $345.93 320.77 816.89 1470 39.27% 179.95% 
MI $90.99 $641.83 16927 119000 116000 14.22% 97.48% 
MN $50.90 $487.31 969.28 9279.4 11854 10.45% 127.75% 
MS $45.65 $624.23 1276.5 17455 17407 7.31% 99.73% 
MO $53.73 $678.10 9992.8 126000 116000 7.93% 92.06% 
MT $7.74 $201.33 20.8 540.78 1672 3.85% 309.18% 
NE $11.10 $338.55 321.52 9807.7 18034 3.28% 183.88% 
NV $17.28 $365.87 112.78 2387.9 4062.7 4.72% 170.14% 
NH $20.47 $281.25 42.909 589.56 1304.9 7.28% 221.33% 
NJ $224.55 $648.86 7175.9 20736 19893 34.61% 95.93% 
NM $18.30 $330.07 363.13 6549.6 12352 5.54% 188.59% 
NY $186.58 $640.20 8565.1 29389 28576 29.14% 97.23% 
NC $104.71 $622.00 25319 150000 151000 16.88% 100.67% 
ND $4.11 $251.57 26.573 1625.6 4022.5 1.63% 247.45% 
OH $132.17 $771.03 29426 168000 139000 17.52% 82.74% 
OK $38.48 $507.90 96.069 1268 1554.1 7.58% 122.56% 
OR $34.37 $278.45 32.317 261.82 585.31 12.34% 223.55% 
PA $150.04 $709.64 39210 184000 163000 21.31% 88.59% 
SC $68.68 $607.82 7054.9 62432 63939 11.30% 102.41% 
SD $5.70 $296.35 27.247 1416.5 2975.3 1.92% 210.05% 
TN $69.46 $752.85 13201 143000 118000 9.23% 82.52% 
TX $132.46 $528.41 934.02 3726.1 4389.6 25.07% 117.81% 
UT $31.07 $286.88 158.52 1463.6 3175.9 10.83% 216.99% 
VA $96.98 $673.84 9856.2 68484 63266 14.39% 92.38% 
WA $68.79 $213.44 16.34 50.696 147.85 32.23% 291.64% 
WV $22.85 $710.85 8123.9 249000 221000 3.26% 88.76% 
WI $59.29 $604.64 9620.6 98119 101000 9.81% 102.94% 
WY $4.98 $264.01 3.2595 172.76 407.36 1.89% 235.80% 
 Total     366072.907 2739789.15 2545068.65 13.36% 92.89% 
All abatement measures are in tons of nitrogen oxides abated from the baseline.  The first columns show the value of the state-level 
and optimal “taxes” while the next three columns show state abatement under the three different policies.  The final two columns show 
the state policy and uniform policy abatement as a percentage of the optimal abatement. 
 
                                                 
12 The nationally uniform tax is $622.50 per ton of NOx. 
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Table 8—Net Benefits of NOx 
  State Net Benefits Optimal Net Benefits 
Uniform Tax Net 
Benefits 
AL $7,066,766 $41,906,795 $41,154,944 
AZ $19,295 $54,988 $7,963 
AR $306,789 $2,697,399 $2,692,586 
CA $213,326 $229,774 $207,717 
CO $27,776 $108,618 -$7,031 
CT $13,439 $36,843 $34,658 
DE $117,075 $2,074,749 $1,865,397 
FL $10,996,446 $16,373,310 $15,799,658 
GA $14,417,009 $49,922,505 $49,805,623 
IL $37,177,548 $111,273,212 $108,614,399 
IN $17,994,051 $94,032,645 $90,190,209 
IA $1,013,742 $9,087,480 $9,062,157 
KS $736,149 $8,007,026 $7,027,597 
KY $12,764,914 $96,692,257 $94,082,653 
LA $1,742,295 $7,091,697 $7,007,590 
ME $335 $1,343 -$11,161 
MD $7,483,184 $24,263,072 $23,841,895 
MA $89,177 $141,295 $50,974 
MI $10,094,291 $38,059,292 $38,407,789 
MN $447,670 $2,260,938 $2,087,065 
MS $767,697 $5,447,856 $5,448,093 
MO $6,507,646 $42,681,457 $42,625,468 
MT $4,107 $54,438 -$183,794 
NE $107,067 $1,660,221 $492,555 
NV $40,289 $436,836 $221,928 
NH $11,629 $82,908 -$39,130 
NJ $3,850,480 $6,727,448 $6,715,959 
NM $116,537 $1,080,941 $232,453 
NY $4,684,362 $9,407,490 $9,400,006 
NC $14,423,026 $46,524,638 $47,071,642 
ND $6,630 $204,480 -$240,041 
OH $20,743,827 $66,405,600 $64,035,633 
OK $46,945 $322,012 $305,623 
OR $8,443 $36,452 -$19,200 
PA $24,883,315 $65,916,967 $65,038,617 
SC $4,045,843 $18,973,539 $18,962,527 
SD $7,997 $209,896 -$44,328 
TN $9,479,993 $53,794,207 $52,010,842 
TX $431,686 $984,455 $953,204 
UT $43,013 $209,941 -$77,403 
VA $6,163,582 $23,073,259 $22,939,162 
WA $2,926 $5,410 -$14,463 
WV $5,682,039 $89,795,746 $88,204,048 
WI $5,531,812 $29,663,596 $29,626,562 
WY $852 $22,805 -$19,244 
 Totals $230,313,021 $968,037,834 $945,569,402 
 Difference from 
Optimal NB 
$737,724,813 
(76.2%)   
$22,468,432 
(2.32%) 
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before crossing into another jurisdiction, the in-state damages are the majority of the total 
damages.  Therefore, these states choose a level of abatement closer to the optimum.   
 Secondly, the optimal abatement tends to occur where the marginal cost of 
abatement is highly inelastic.  This allows a little bit of flexibility in the tax (or induced 
marginal cost) so that policies that induce anything in the neighborhood of the optimal 
marginal cost yield virtually the same abatement as the optimal policy.  Figure 6 for 
North Carolina illustrates this case.  The optimal marginal abatement cost occurs in a 
region where abatement is inelastic, so any perturbation in the uniform tax around the 
optimal tax still yields a reasonably efficient outcome. 
 When states choose their own levels in the SO2 case, the resulting arrangement 
represents a loss of 31.5% of the benefits that the fully differentiated optimal solution 
could provide.  This represents a loss of over $18 billion per year.  The uniform pollution 
“tax,” on the other hand, generates a loss of only 0.22% of the potential benefits under 
the fully differentiated system.  This suggests that an optimally chosen uniform tax would 
reasonably approximate the fully optimal solution.  On the other hand, the substantial loss 
of the state policies suggests that air pollution should be regulated at the federal level. 
 In the case of NOx, the contrast is even more severe.  The state policies result in a 
loss of 76.2% of the potential benefits, while the uniform policy results in a loss of 
2.32%.  The uniform policy again approximates the fully differentiated solution fairly 
well. 
 However, even though the totals are very close, the distribution of benefits is 
quite different because the uniform tax will cause some states to over-abate while other 
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states will under-abate.13
Sensitivity Analysis 
  If a state overabates enough, their costs might exceed their total 
benefits (even including benefits accruing from other states).  This will lead some states 
to benefit more from the state-level policy than the uniform policy.  Ten states benefit 
more from the state-level policy for SO2 as shown in Figure 10.   
 The TAF model makes some restrictive modeling judgments that might need to be 
relaxed.  One such assumption is that the willingness to pay for the health effects in the 
model is constant across the entire population.  However, the VSL literature finds a clear 
relationship between income and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for health risk reduction.  
This relationship can be used to adjust the benefits derived from TAF to take account of 
state-to-state differences in income.  First, we take the calculated income elasticity from 
the VSL literature.  Mrozek and Taylor (2002) discuss several income elasticities derived 
in the literature.  Their three best estimates are 0.36, 0.46, and 0.49.  Miller (2000) 
presents similar results, citing 0.36 and 0.46 as appropriate values.  Viscusi and Aldy 
(2003) suggest measures from 0.5 to 0.6.  For good measure, we also consider a wider 
range of values, from 0.15 and 0.75.  These elasticities are multiplied by the percentage 
difference between each state’s per-capita income and national average per-capita 
income.  The resulting value represents how much each WTP figure should be adjusted.  
Tables 9 and 10 show the resulting “taxes” for each elasticity value.  In addition, the 
nationally uniform tax levels must also be adjusted.   
                                                 
13 As noted in Table 1, the majority of states overabate under the uniform tax.  However, 
those that overabate by large percentages are low-emissions states, so that the large 
percentage numbers are small in absolute terms.  Those states that underabate do so in 
small percentage terms but in large absolute terms. 
42 
 
 
Figure 10—Distributional Effects of the SO2 Policies 
 
 
The darker states experience higher net benefits under their own respective state-level 
policies than they do under the national uniform policy. 
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Table 9—Optimal SO2 Taxes under Differing Income Elasticities 
State η = 0 η= 0.15 η = 0.36 η = 0.46 η = 0.49 η = 0.75 
AL $4,133.10 $4,114.02 $4,090.17 $4,078.82 $4,075.41 $4,045.89 
AZ $1,707.51 $1,697.88 $1,684.39 $1,677.97 $1,676.05 $1,659.35 
AR $4,637.93 $4,605.22 $4,559.43 $4,537.63 $4,531.08 $4,474.39 
CA $6,199.27 $6,229.79 $6,272.52 $6,292.87 $6,298.97 $6,351.87 
CO $1,632.33 $1,629.52 $1,625.58 $1,623.71 $1,623.15 $1,618.28 
CT $3,739.77 $3,839.73 $3,979.68 $4,046.32 $4,066.32 $4,239.59 
DE $2,526.79 $2,567.54 $2,624.60 $2,651.76 $2,659.91 $2,730.55 
FL $3,528.00 $3,520.90 $3,510.96 $3,506.23 $3,504.81 $3,492.50 
GA $3,825.17 $3,821.49 $3,816.34 $3,813.88 $3,813.15 $3,806.77 
IL $4,428.95 $4,210.55 $4,214.80 $4,216.83 $4,217.44 $4,222.71 
IN $4,271.14 $4,272.90 $4,275.37 $4,276.54 $4,276.90 $4,279.95 
IA $3,184.11 $3,186.13 $3,188.97 $3,190.32 $3,190.73 $3,194.24 
KS $2,943.90 $2,934.61 $2,921.61 $2,915.42 $2,913.56 $2,897.46 
KY $4,362.10 $4,360.49 $4,358.25 $4,357.18 $4,356.86 $4,354.07 
LA $4,122.66 $4,074.88 $4,007.98 $3,976.13 $3,966.57 $3,883.75 
ME $1,091.30 $1,100.87 $1,114.27 $1,120.64 $1,122.56 $1,139.14 
MD $3,874.41 $3,929.29 $4,006.12 $4,042.70 $4,053.68 $4,148.79 
MA $2,304.91 $2,356.78 $2,429.40 $2,463.99 $2,474.36 $2,564.27 
MI $3,580.13 $3,598.87 $3,625.10 $3,637.60 $3,641.35 $3,673.83 
MN $2,973.92 $2,980.59 $2,989.92 $2,994.37 $2,995.70 $3,007.26 
MS $3,893.92 $3,862.66 $3,818.89 $3,798.05 $3,791.79 $3,737.60 
MO $3,682.91 $3,678.37 $3,672.01 $3,668.98 $3,668.08 $3,660.20 
MT $1,104.10 $1,100.54 $1,095.56 $1,093.19 $1,092.48 $1,086.32 
NE $1,584.08 $1,579.82 $1,573.85 $1,571.01 $1,570.16 $1,562.77 
NV $2,389.29 $2,389.74 $2,390.35 $2,390.65 $2,390.73 $2,391.50 
NH $1,474.36 $1,499.33 $1,534.29 $1,550.94 $1,555.94 $1,599.22 
NJ $4,922.04 $5,045.46 $5,218.25 $5,300.54 $5,325.22 $5,539.15 
NM $1,633.95 $1,624.90 $1,612.23 $1,606.20 $1,604.39 $1,588.70 
NY $3,889.20 $3,962.27 $4,064.58 $4,113.30 $4,127.91 $4,254.57 
NC $4,753.78 $4,776.67 $4,808.70 $4,823.96 $4,828.53 $4,868.20 
ND $1,109.55 $1,109.15 $1,108.59 $1,108.33 $1,108.25 $1,107.56 
OH $3,874.56 $3,895.93 $3,925.86 $3,940.11 $3,944.39 $3,981.44 
OK $3,455.63 $3,429.38 $3,392.63 $3,375.13 $3,369.88 $3,324.38 
OR $3,196.00 $3,205.92 $3,219.80 $3,226.41 $3,228.40 $3,245.58 
PA $3,843.79 $3,888.56 $3,951.24 $3,981.09 $3,990.04 $4,067.65 
SC $3,529.74 $3,530.64 $3,531.89 $3,532.49 $3,532.66 $3,534.21 
SD $1,414.55 $1,414.14 $1,413.56 $1,413.28 $1,413.20 $1,412.49 
TN $4,393.99 $4,386.87 $4,376.89 $4,372.14 $4,370.72 $4,358.37 
TX $3,194.46 $3,170.27 $3,136.41 $3,120.28 $3,115.44 $3,073.51 
UT $1,648.95 $1,640.82 $1,629.44 $1,624.02 $1,622.39 $1,608.30 
VA $4,929.50 $4,985.66 $5,064.28 $5,101.72 $5,112.95 $5,210.29 
WA $1,726.98 $1,733.46 $1,742.53 $1,746.85 $1,748.15 $1,759.38 
WV $3,691.71 $3,719.76 $3,759.04 $3,777.74 $3,783.35 $3,831.98 
WI $3,436.60 $3,445.41 $3,457.73 $3,463.60 $3,465.36 $3,480.63 
WY $1,286.52 $1,282.50 $1,276.89 $1,274.21 $1,273.41 $1,266.45 
 
 
44 
 
 
Table 10—State-Level SO2 Taxes under Differing Income Elasticities 
State η = 0 η= 0.15 η = 0.36 η = 0.46 η = 0.49 η = 0.75 
AL 343.5809 335.302 323.9503 318.5447 316.923 302.8684 
AZ 247.7987 245.5396 242.3769 240.8709 240.4191 236.5033 
AR 375.5853 363.3636 346.2532 338.1054 335.661 314.4768 
CA 4975.46 5014.32 5068.723 5094.63 5102.401 5169.758 
CO 291.5327 296.5201 303.5024 306.8274 307.8249 316.4697 
CT 1060.46 1113.36 1187.42 1222.687 1233.267 1324.961 
DE 81.55593 82.52953 83.89256 84.54162 84.73634 86.4239 
FL 1240.304 1240.045 1239.683 1239.511 1239.459 1239.011 
GA 482.7937 481.3411 479.3074 478.339 478.0485 475.5307 
IL 837.0388 803.569 815.304 820.8921 822.5685 837.0975 
IN 435.2898 431.6905 426.6514 424.2518 423.5319 417.293 
IA 139.5079 137.6535 135.0573 133.821 133.4501 130.2357 
KS 113.8696 113.0143 111.8168 111.2466 111.0756 109.593 
KY 307.6862 300.2161 289.7579 284.7778 283.2837 270.3354 
LA 657.8107 636.4418 606.5254 592.2795 588.0057 550.9663 
ME 302.3202 297.6566 291.1276 288.0185 287.0858 279.0023 
MD 654.9938 673.3219 698.9813 711.2 714.8656 746.6343 
MA 1063.058 1095.301 1140.442 1161.937 1168.386 1224.274 
MI 534.4954 536.6532 539.6742 541.1128 541.5443 545.2846 
MN 399.8446 404.3205 410.5869 413.5708 414.466 422.2244 
MS 293.6705 281.9696 265.5884 257.7879 255.4477 235.1663 
MO 260.8717 257.8789 253.689 251.6939 251.0953 245.9079 
MT 52.38943 50.77457 48.51377 47.4372 47.11423 44.31514 
NE 52.59966 51.87817 50.86809 50.3871 50.2428 48.99222 
NV 126.131 126.4833 126.9766 127.2114 127.2819 127.8926 
NH 134.7686 136.8821 139.8412 141.2502 141.6729 145.3365 
NJ 2297.017 2383.51 2504.601 2562.263 2579.562 2729.483 
NM 99.15804 96.17737 92.00444 90.01733 89.4212 84.25471 
NY 1249.496 1265.141 1287.045 1297.475 1300.604 1327.723 
NC 1071.423 1061.894 1048.553 1042.2 1040.294 1023.776 
ND 19.34157 18.82844 18.11006 17.76797 17.66535 16.77592 
OH 549.6087 547.3783 544.2559 542.769 542.323 538.4571 
OK 261.4378 254.2784 244.2553 239.4824 238.0505 225.641 
OR 621.0938 618.3015 614.3923 612.5308 611.9724 607.1324 
PA 859.5877 855.3648 849.4528 846.6376 845.793 838.4733 
SC 462.8003 453.8217 441.2517 435.266 433.4703 417.9074 
SD 28.87139 28.06391 26.93343 26.39511 26.23362 24.83398 
TN 383.8149 377.9636 369.7717 365.8708 364.7005 354.5581 
TX 628.0798 619.4821 607.4454 601.7136 599.9941 585.0915 
UT 236.2431 230.6585 222.84 219.117 218 208.3201 
VA 1040.731 1058 1082.177 1093.69 1097.144 1127.077 
WA 731.5348 738.58 748.4434 753.1402 754.5493 766.7611 
WV 101.5725 97.94474 92.86588 90.44738 89.72182 83.43371 
WI 373.5039 372.6838 371.5356 370.9889 370.8248 369.4033 
WY 26.08348 25.63889 25.01646 24.72006 24.63114 23.86052 
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Net benefits and percentage losses are summarized by η value in Table 11.  For 
SO2, assuming a larger income elasticity (η) causes the state policy net benefits to fall 
slightly while the uniform policy benefits rise slightly, further exacerbating the difference 
between the two policies.  This result is somewhat counterintuitive.  As the income 
elasticity rises, so does state level heterogeneity in damages.14
Conclusions 
  Since heterogeneity in 
damages is the rationale for the possible superiority of state-level policies, it would seem 
that higher income elasticity should improve the position of the state policies relative to 
the uniform policy.  However, the result is driven by the fact that lower-income states 
tend to be downwind from higher income states in general.  Thus, abatement increases in 
high income states, but the benefits from that abatement are experienced by lower income 
downwind states.  In addition, when low income states reduce abatement, more pollution 
is spread downwind into high income states.  For the case of nitrogen oxides, the 
situation is similar.  Higher values of the income elasticity worsen both policies relative 
to the optimal situation, but the state policies are clearly still less advantageous. 
 With the first-best situation unattainable, the two feasible options should be 
compared to see which is closer to the optimum.  State differentiated policies can account 
for heterogeneity in damages, while a uniform national policy can control for interstate 
pollution spillovers.  Using Haiku, a model of the U.S. electricity market, and TAF, an 
integrated assessment model of air pollution transport and valuation, this paper has  
                                                 
14 The standard deviation of state level benefits is 801.44 when η = 0, but rises to 860.43 
when η = 0.75. 
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Table 11—Net Benefits and Percentage Losses by η Value 
  SO2 NOx 
  State Uniform Optimal State Uniform Optimal 
η = 0 
Net 
Benefits $40,913,165,839 $59,621,941,265 $59,735,888,591 $230,313,021 $945,569,402 $968,037,834 
 
Percent 
Loss 31.51% 0.19%  76.21% 2.32%  
η = 0.15 
Net 
Benefits $40,525,917,345 $59,380,399,884 $59,495,532,449 $230,509,160 $951,163,853 $973,335,159 
 
Percent 
Loss 31.88% 0.19%  76.32% 2.28%  
η = 0.36 
Net 
Benefits $40,547,365,962 $59,697,208,459 $59,813,565,764 $230,803,697 $956,009,220 $980,395,891 
 
Percent 
Loss 32.21% 0.19%  76.46% 2.49%  
η = 0.46 
Net 
Benefits $40,557,740,147 $59,847,639,336 $59,964,710,787 $230,951,331 $957,766,940 $982,425,062 
 
Percent 
Loss 32.36% 0.20%  76.49% 2.51%  
η = 0.49 
Net 
Benefits $40,560,953,938 $59,892,942,679 $60,010,046,090 $230,995,938 $959,011,166 $984,603,813 
 
Percent 
Loss 32.41% 0.20%  76.54% 2.60%  
η = 0.75 
Net 
Benefits $40,587,147,128 $60,284,470,780 $60,404,498,955 $231,407,348 $968,701,965 $993,987,291 
 
Percent 
Loss 32.81% 0.20%  76.72% 2.54%  
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shown that the uniform federal policy performs better than the state-level policies for the 
cases of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides from electricity plants.  The state-level 
policies capture only 68.5% of the optimal benefits from SO2 abatement and 23.8% of the 
benefits of NOx.  The national uniform policy, on the other hand, accounts for 99.8% of 
the sulfur dioxide benefits and 97.7% of the benefits of NOx abatement.  Sensitivity 
analysis confirms that these results are robust to several measures of income elasticity.
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CHAPTER 3:  CONSTITUENT INTEREST, GREEN ELECTRICITY POLICIES, 
AND LEGISLATIVE VOTING 
 
 States have long had the ability to enact their own environmental legislation that 
is more stringent than federal legislation.  In addition, at the federal level, some state’s 
legislators vote for increased national environmental stringency while others vote to 
reduce it.  How do we explain these interstate differences in policy preferences?  There 
are several factors at work.  Political factors such as the ideology and political party of 
elected officials certainly play a part.  Social variables like race, age, and sex can also 
affect preferences.  Finally, economic interests such as specific industry production, 
potential to meet regulation, income, and other factors influence these decisions.   
 Political scientists and economists have often tried to disentangle the effects of 
ideology, party affiliation, and constituent interest (Kalt and Zupan 1984, 1990; Kau and 
Rubin 1979, 1981; Peltzman 1984; Coates and Munger 1995; Vachon and Menz 2006; 
Anderson 2007).  Most of these studies find that ideology is an important determinant of 
policy-making.  However, these studies use measures of constituent interest that are 
somewhat problematic.  Some of the studies rely on local demographic variables, past 
voting history of the constituency, or environmental interest group membership to proxy 
for interest.  While these measures are sometimes good proxies, they can be inherently 
limited.  Local demographic characteristics may not correlate well with interest, while 
past voting history is not as much a measure of interest as it is a measure of constituent 
ideology over a wide range of policies.  Environmental interest group membership as 
used by Anderson (2007) is a good option, but it only measures the interest of the most 
avid environmentalists.  Moreover, it ignores the strength of opposing interests.  In 
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analyses that focus on a wider spectrum, a more objective, broad-based approach is 
necessary.  In these cases, constituent interest should be measured by the actual costs and 
benefits of the proposed policies in the context where the decision is being made.  Put in 
other terms, an economist advising a government would recommend policies to maximize 
net benefits.  This chapter tests whether such benefits are a factor in observed patterns 
across states.   
 Air pollution regulation provides an excellent example of these factors.  Air 
pollution affects the entire population, and damages are affected by many factors, such as 
atmospheric transportation and population density.  In addition, air pollution is a 
transboundary problem—pollution from one jurisdiction travels into other jurisdictions.  
Accordingly, regulation of air pollution has typically occurred at the federal level.  For 
example, the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, enacted at the federal level, call for 
market-based policies for sulfur dioxide emissions and stratospheric ozone-depleting 
substances.  Although the Clean Air Act was enacted at the federal level, there are many 
things that states can do beyond the federal legislation.  States can require grandfathered 
stationary sources to comply with best available control technology rather than the 
federally required best available retrofit technology.  In the tradable permits markets, 
states can also retire permits, effectively reducing the total amount of emissions.  In 
addition, states can implement a number of policies designed to encourage “green” 
electricity generation.  These include renewable portfolio standards, net metering rules, 
generation disclosure rules, and public benefit funds.   
 This split of federal policies and state policies creates a dichotomy in the study of 
policy adoption.  States may wish to encourage more stringent federal policies in order to 
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restrict transboundary pollution spillovers from their neighbors, while adopting state-
level policies to suite their own costs and benefits.  These situations provide ideal 
circumstances to test different measures of constituent interest. 
 Using Haiku, a detailed simulation model of the U.S. electricity market, and the 
Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF), an integrated assessment model of air 
pollutant transmission and benefits, we construct reliable measures of constituency 
interest based on the actual costs and benefits of sulfur dioxide pollution.15
 Although most studies in these areas have found that ideology and party 
affiliation dominate while constituent interest is often not significant (see, for example, 
Coates and Munger 1995; Clinton 2006; Vachon and Menz 2006), our analyses suggest 
that constituent interest is important in both areas.  Importantly, in the case of legislative 
roll-call voting, our measure of air quality interest proves most important when 
explaining votes related to energy issues and air pollution issues, while displaying a 
lesser effect on other environmental bills. 
  We then use 
these measures in new analyses of two areas where the ideology/constituent interest 
debate is well developed:  state adoption of more stringent green electricity policies and 
legislative roll-call voting on environmental issues. 
Economic Interests 
 We use the Haiku and TAF to generate indicators of constituent interests in the 
following way.  First, we use the data derived in Chapter 2 for the policies most efficient 
                                                 
15 For more information on Haiku and TAF, see the discussion in Chapter 2. 
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at the state level as our first measure of constituent interest.16
 The second measure that we construct is a measure of which uniform “tax” (or 
shadow cost of abatement) each state would like to see imposed at the national level.  To 
derive this measure, we take the output from Haiku for each tax level and run the data 
through TAF.  This gives the state-level benefits of each tax level.  These benefits include 
not only the benefits from that state’s abatement, but also the benefits accruing because 
less pollution is flowing into that state from upwind states.  For each state, we then 
calculate the state abatement that results from each tax level.  We then measure the cost 
of attaining that abatement by calculating the area under the MCA curve up to that 
abatement level.  Then, total costs are subtracted from total benefits to get the net benefits 
of each tax level for each state.  Then, the tax level that provides the highest level of net 
benefits represents the tax level that each state would find most beneficial at the federal 
level.  These tax levels are given in the third column of Table 12. 
  Since the within-state 
marginal benefit measure represents the interest of each state in determining the efficient 
level of sulfur dioxide pollution from its own electricity plants, it is an ideal measure to 
use in explaining adoption of state-level green electricity policies.  We will test two 
measures:  the raw efficient “tax” level for each state, which measures only the benefits 
side of the issue, and the abatement generated by that level as a percentage of the state’s 
abatement under the current going price in the sulfur dioxide trading market.  These 
variables are present in Table 12.  The first column of data represents each state’s “tax” 
level, while the second column is the percentage measure. 
                                                 
16 “Interest” in this sense refers strictly to what is in the best “interest” of the health of the 
population.  It does not include measures of non-use value or altruistic value. 
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Table 12—Constituent Interest Variables 
 
State Level 
“Tax” 
State Abatement 
as a % of Sulfur 
Trading Levels 
State’s Most 
Beneficial 
Uniform Tax 
AL $343.58 90.41% $2,000 
AZ $247.80 98.84% $2,000 
AR $375.59 65.21% $2,000 
CA $4,975.46 1534.77% $6,000 
CO $291.53 76.72% $1,500 
CT $1,060.46 226.92% $6,500 
DE $81.56 21.46% $6,000 
FL $1,240.30 249.18% $2,400 
GA $482.79 127.05% $2,000 
ID - - $6,000 
IL $837.04 36.71% $2,000 
IN $435.29 193.87% $2,000 
IA $139.51 114.55% $2,400 
KS $113.87 29.96% $2,000 
KY $307.69 80.97% $2,000 
LA $657.81 193.40% $2,000 
ME $302.32 291.83% $6,500 
MD $654.99 188.30% $6,000 
MA $1,063.06 79.55% $6,500 
MI $534.50 184.85% $2,600 
MN $399.84 105.22% $2,700 
MS $293.67 68.65% $2,000 
MO $260.87 77.28% $2,000 
MT $52.39 13.79% $2,000 
NE $52.60 190.11% $2,000 
NV $126.13 5.09% $500 
NH $134.77 13.84% $6,500 
NJ $2,297.02 35.46% $6,500 
NM $99.16 339.62% $6,000 
NY $1,249.50 26.09% $6,500 
NC $1,071.42 33.19% $2,400 
ND $19.34 253.42% $2,000 
OH $549.61 188.42% $2,400 
OK $261.44 68.80% $2,000 
OR $621.09 228.81% $2,000 
PA $859.59 218.10% $2,400 
RI - - $6,500 
SC $462.80 121.79% $2,400 
SD $28.87 7.60% $2,000 
TN $383.81 101.00% $2,000 
TX $628.08 191.85% $2,000 
UT $236.24 62.17% $2,000 
VT - - $6,500 
VA $1,040.73 193.12% $6,000 
WA $731.53 269.51% $2,000 
WV $101.57 98.29% $500 
WI $373.50 26.73% $2,000 
WY $26.08 6.86% $500 
   Values in the first column represents the state’s efficient  
   “tax” or shadow price of abatement.  The second column  
   shows their abatement at this level as a percentage of their  
   abatement at the current sulfur dioxide trading price. 
   The third category shows the state’s most beneficial national  
   uniform “tax” level. 
53 
 
 
 Since these uniform tax levels represent the level that each state would find most 
beneficial if implemented at the federal level, it is a good measure of constituent interest 
in the case of legislative voting on national environmental issues related to energy and air 
pollution.  Analysis of legislative roll-call voting on these issues is presented in Section 4. 
Analysis of State Green Electricity Policies 
 States have adopted a wide range of green electricity policies (Menz 2005).  Four 
main types of policies are renewable portfolio standards, net metering rules, public 
benefit funds, and generation disclosure rules (Vachon and Menz 2006).  The levels of 
“taxes” that the states find most efficient for themselves should indicate which states 
adopt such policies.  States that experience higher marginal abatement costs in our model 
should be the ones that we observe to adopt more stringent environmental policies in their 
electricity sector, ceteris paribus.  
 Okazaki (2006) examines the effects of adopting these policies on the amount of 
renewable energy used in the state, controlling for a state’s potential to generate 
renewable energy and other socioeconomic variables.  He finds evidence that adopting 
these policies increases the amount of renewable energy generated.  We adopt his 
measure of renewable energy potential, as discussed below.  Other studies have attempted 
to disentangle the effects of political, social, and economic factors when explaining state 
adoption of more stringent environmental policies (Lester et al. 1983; Lester and 
Lombard 1990; Ringquist 1993, 2002).  Vachon and Menz (2006) use a variety of 
political, social, and economic variables to explain which states adopt green electricity 
policies.  They find that income, education, environmental interest groups, and legislative 
voting influence the adoption of these regulations.   
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 However, what studies of this type are missing is a clear, objective measure of the 
policy that is in the true best interest of the state.  My variables measure the states’ 
interest in air quality, and provide a measurement of constituent interest that is based on 
health benefits that has not been used in the previous literature.  Following Vachon and 
Menz (2006), we examine four state-level policies:  renewable portfolio standards, net 
metering rules, public benefit funds, and generation disclosure rules. 
 Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are requirements on the percentage of 
electricity generation (or sometimes electricity sales) that must come from qualifying 
renewable sources.  Renewable portfolio standards are designed to stimulate the use of 
renewable sources used by electricity suppliers.  As of 2005, 19 states had adopted 
renewable portfolio standards (Vachon and Menz 2006). 
 Net metering rules (NMR) allow consumers to use their own renewable electricity 
systems to replace commercially available power.  For example, a consumer may install 
solar panels to power their house while using the power company’s electricity as a back-
up system when they do not generate enough.  Consumers may even be able to sell 
excess power generated on the grid.  When net metering rules are in effect, power 
companies must allow consumers this opportunity.  Thirty-three states had net metering 
rules in effect in 2005. 
 Public benefit funds (PBF) are taxes levied on electricity consumption.  The tax 
revenues are used to sponsor renewable electricity programs.  Public benefit funds are the 
least widely adopted policy, with only 15 states adopting them by 2005.   
 Lastly, generation disclosure rules require utilities to disclose information to 
consumers on their fuel sources and emissions.  Similar in spirit to ecolabeling, it is 
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expected that increased knowledge will cause consumers to seek renewable sources while 
utilities are encouraged to adopt them.  As of 2005, 24 states had generation disclosure 
rules in effect.  Table 13 contains information on which states adopted each of these four 
policies.   
 In addition to the above named policies, some states have implemented state level 
legislation that targets emissions.  In 2002, North Carolina passed the Clean Smokestacks 
Act, designed to cut NOx emissions by 77% and SO2 emissions by 73% by the year 2013 
(NCDENR 2002).  Similar programs have been implemented in California, Texas, and 
New York.  However, since these programs are widely diverse, it is impossible to 
quantify them in order to include a separate analysis of their adoption.   
Data and Methodology 
 Logit models are used to determine the effect of the constituent interest variables 
on adoption of each of the four green electricity policies.   
 The probability of state i adopting policy j is  
 01
1
ijij
ij
uu
u
ij
ee
ep
+
=        (1) 
where 1iju  is the observed social welfare of adopting policy j for state i and 
0
iju  is the 
social welfare of not adopting the policy.  True social welfare is measured by 
ijijij uv ε+= .  ijε  is an iid type I extreme value error.  Normalizing 0
0 =iju , we have 
 1
1
1 ij
ij
u
u
ij
e
ep
+
= .        (2) 
56 
 
 
Table 13—State Adoption of Green Electricity Initiatives 
State Renewable 
Portfolio 
Standards 
Net Metering 
Rules 
Public Benefit 
Funds 
Generation 
Disclosure 
Rules 
Proportion of 
Renewable Energy 
Alabama     2.7 
Alaska     .1 
Arizona X   X .0 
Arkansas  X   3.4 
California X X X X 12.4 
Colorado X X  X .5 
Connecticut X X X X 4.6 
Delaware  X X X .0 
Florida    X 2.7 
Georgia  X   2.6 
Hawaii X X   6.3 
Idaho     5.3 
Illinois X  X X .5 
Indiana  X   .1 
Iowa X X  X 2.7 
Kansas     .8 
Kentucky  X   .5 
Louisiana  X   2.8 
Maine X X X X 20.4 
Maryland X X  X 1.6 
Massachusetts X X X X 4.3 
Michigan    X 2.4 
Minnesota X X X X 3.7 
Mississippi     3.4 
Missouri     .2 
Montana  X X X .2 
Nebraska     .3 
Nevada X X   3.4 
New Hampshire  X   4.0 
New Jersey X X X X 2.3 
New Mexico X X   3.3 
New York X X X X 2.0 
North Carolina     1.5 
North Dakota  X   .7 
Ohio  X X X .3 
Oklahoma  X   1.4 
Oregon  X X X 2.3 
Pennsylvania X X X X 1.4 
Rhode Island X  X X 2.1 
South Carolina     1.9 
South Dakota     2.1 
Tennessee     .6 
Texas X X  X 1.1 
Utah  X   .5 
Vermont  X  X 7.4 
Virginia  X  X 3.7 
Washington  X  X 2.3 
West Virginia     .2 
Wisconsin X X X  2.1 
Wyoming  X   1.4 
An “X” indicates that the state in the first column had that policy in effect as of 2005. 
Adapted from Vachon and Menz (2006) 
57 
 
 
1
iju  is an index given by  
 iij CIXu ⋅++= γβα
1 ,       (3) 
where X represents the various social, political, and demographic variables, including 
renewable potential, which represents each state’s potential to generate renewable energy.  
This variable is obtained from the Union of Concerned Scientists and reflects the 
technical potential of a state to generate renewable electricity.  Economic factors such as 
transmission costs are not factored into renewable potential.  This data was previously 
used by Okazaki (2006).  CI represents the constituent interest variables derived in the 
state level analysis above.  Median income is drawn from the 2000 Census.  Baseline 
emissions from the Haiku model are included as a proxy for economic interest in 
polluting industries.  State level constituent ideology is measured by the Cook partisan 
voting index (PVI), which is based on the state’s voting history in the last two 
presidential elections.17
 Congressional Voting Analysis 
  State political ideology is measured by party control of state 
government, as evidenced by the party affiliation of the state governor.  State adoption of 
green electricity policies is adapted from Vachon and Menz (2006).  Table 14 presents 
summary statistics of these data, which represent a cross-section for the year 2005. 
 If Congress responds to differences in environmental damages faced by their 
constituencies, the estimate on what level of “tax” each state would prefer the whole 
country to have should predict how legislators from each state vote on national air quality  
                                                 
17 The Cook PVI score consists of a letter (D or R) and a number.  The D signifies that 
the state leans toward the Democratic party, while an R implies Republican leanings.  To 
simplify the analysis, I transform all D PVI scores into negative numbers so that the 
variable represents a consistent scale. 
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Table 14—Summary Statistics for Green Electricity Analysis 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Statetax State’s efficient tax level (in hundreds of 
dollars) 
5.890404 7.947005 
Stpctg State’s efficient abatement level as a 
multiple of abatement at 2008 SO2 trading 
price 
1.517638 2.268343 
Statecorn State production of corn (in 100,000’s of 
bushels) 
11.36674 21.78749 
Renewpot State’s renewable potential (multiple of 
current energy use) 
18.14911 41.29916 
Baseline Baseline emissions from Haiku (in 
100,000’s of tons of SO2) 
4.226192 5.660708 
PVIScore State’s Cook partisan voting index (higher 
values indicate a more conservative base) 
1.533333 8.423431 
PctUrban Percent of population living in urban areas 0.718179 0.141383 
PctBlack Percent of population that is African-
American 
0.106757 0.096211 
PctAsian Percent of population that is Asian 0.021222 0.019202 
PctHisp Percent of population that is Hispanic 0.079779 0.09258 
PctOver65 Percent of population that is older than 65 0.126488 0.0167 
Medincome Median income (in 10,000’s of dollars) 4.103662 0.630447 
PctGas Percentage of housing units that use natural 
gas in home heating 
0.529682 0.182024 
PctElec Percentage of housing units that use 
electricity in home heating 
0.252633 0.157751 
Popdens Population density (people per square mile) 173.7924 227.4489 
DemConU Percentage of Democratic control in the 
upper house of the state legislature 
0.512567 0.138428 
DemConL Percentage of Democratic control in the 
lower house of the state legislature 
0.528922 0.131912 
Govdem =1 if state has a Democratic governor, 0 
otherwise 
0.577778 0.495291 
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legislation.  The central hypothesis is that legislators with a higher modeled national 
uniform tax preference are more likely to vote in favor of more stringent national air 
standards.  This case differs from the previous because it depends on interstate spillovers.  
A state like New Hampshire may have little reason to regulate its own pollution (see 
Table 7), yet its federal representatives may have good reasons to regulate upwind states. 
 Mehmood and Zwang (2001) find that party affiliation, geographic location, and 
percentage of urban population are important factors in explaining congressional voting.  
Therefore, we control for these factors in our analysis.  Anderson (2007) finds a link 
between congressional voting and environmental interest group membership in the 
district.  Coates and Munger (1995) find that a legislator’s ideology is much more 
important in his or her voting pattern than constituent interest, while constituent interest 
can become an important factor during re-election years.  However, in these previous 
studies, constituent interest is measured by variables that reflect different aspects of 
constituent interest.  My variables measure the potential damages from pollution, and are 
free from ideological considerations.  My analysis provides a new and unique measure of 
constituent interest based on economic estimates of costs and benefits and is better suited 
to this analysis.  In particular, we use the level of federal regulation that maximizes net 
benefits for each state.   
Data and methodology 
 One important decision is which votes are to be included in the analysis.  This 
decision is inherently subjective.  To avoid subjectivity in our decision, we take those 
votes that are deemed of environmental significance by the League of Conservation 
Voters (LCV), a prominent environmental group.  This is a common metric used in 
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previous studies (e.g., Anderson 2007).  Using LCV data from 2003-3007, we observe 65 
different roll-call votes in the House of Representatives on environmental issues and 51 
roll-call votes in the Senate.  We then classify these votes according to their subject 
matter:  27.4% of the votes are about energy, 38.8% about land or resource usage, 13.8% 
related to air pollution, 6.7% about environmental policy procedure, 5.0% on water 
issues, 6.9% on environmental funding, and 9.6% in other areas.  Note that these 
percentages do not add to 100% as some bills fall into more than one category.  My 
measure of constituent interest is most relevant for votes involving energy and air 
pollution, and it is expected that the tax variable would have a greater effect on these 
categories than on others, such as water.  Therefore, we also create interaction terms 
between the tax variable and each category to split up the effect.  This provides a test of 
the validity of the constituent interest variable.   
 Since each legislator casts votes on many different bills, the dataset is a panel.  
However, since representatives and senators may be newly elected (or fail to be 
reelected) within the time period, the panel is unbalanced.  Over the five-year period, we 
observe 556 different members in the House of Representatives and 112 different 
members of the Senate.  Some representatives and senators cast votes over the full panels, 
while the minimum number of votes cast is two.  For each voting opportunity, we 
observe one of three outcomes:  a vote in favor of the environment, a vote against, or a 
failure to vote.  Since some legislators decide not to vote when they could vote (about 
2.6% of the sample), this could lead to sample selection issues.  As discussed below, our 
results are robust to different ways of handling this issue. 
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 A number of variables related to the legislator should be included.  We record 
party affiliation, tenure in Congress, and age from the House of Representatives and 
Senate web pages.  In addition, we obtained a measure of ideology from Poole and 
Rosenthal (1997).  This value is based on an extensive computer model of historical 
voting; lower values represent a more liberal member and higher values a more 
conservative member.  In our sample, the lowest value is -1.093 (Sen. Feingold, D-WI), 
while the highest value is 1.364 (Rep. Paul, R-TX).   
 In addition to representative-specific variables, we must include variables 
significant at the state and local level.  At the state level, we include state corn production 
as a proxy for interest in biofuels.  In addition, we include renewable energy potential as 
in Okazaki (2006).   
 At the local level, we have a variety of data broken down by Congressional 
district or state.  Variables at the local level include median income, ethnic variables, age, 
unemployment, and population density.  These variables are obtained from the 2000 
Census.  We also include a measure of the ideology of the district, as measured by the 
Cook partisan voting index (PVI).  Summary statistics for the House of Representatives 
voting data is given in Table 15.  Summary statistics for the Senate voting data is given in 
Table 16. 
 It is possible that some of the effect of the level of federal “tax” preferred is 
captured indirectly through the party affiliation variable, Democrat.  States that are more 
susceptible to emissions damages may be more likely to elect Democratic leaders who 
will vote in favor of environmental legislation.  However, if this is the case, then the 
results will be biased toward zero, so that any effect found carries a stronger conclusion.   
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Table 15—Summary Statistics for House of Representatives Voting Analysis 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
Deviation 
voteres =1 if vote for environmental policy, 0 otherwise 0.4875 0.4999 
Ordvoteres =2 if vote for environmental policy, 1 if no vote 
recorded, 0 otherwise 
0.9805 0.9869 
Voted =1 if a vote was recorded, 0 otherwise 0.9743 0.1584 
Democrat =1 if a Representative is a Democrat 0.4747 0.4994 
Statecorn State corn production (in bushels) 1,134,611 2,197,781 
Renewpot State’s renewable potential (% of current energy 
use) 
487.98 1,582.0 
Tax State’s most beneficial uniform national tax 3,471.1 1,955.4 
Energy =1 if vote is classified as Energy-related, 0 
otherwise 
0.26145 0.43943 
Landres =1 if vote is classified as land use or resource-
related, 0 otherwise 
  
Pollution =1 if vote is related to air pollution   
Envpolpro =1 if vote is related to environmental policy 
procedures 
  
Water =1 if vote is classified as water-related   
Envfund =1 if vote is related to environmental funding   
Other =1 if vote does not fit into any one of the above 
categories 
  
Dnomscore Legislator ideology as measured by the D-
Nominate score (higher values are more 
conservative) 
0.06916 0.50403 
Pviscore Ideology of the Congressional District -1.4565 14.233 
Pcturban Percent of population that lives in urban areas 0.78964 0.19814 
Pctblck Percent of the population that is black 0.12094 0.14883 
Pctasian Percent of the population that is Asian 0.036302 0.05314 
Pcthisp Percent of the population that is Hispanic 0.12536 0.16411 
Pctmale Percent of the population that is male 0.49009 0.010103 
Pctover65 Percent of the population that is over 65 0.12444 0.031809 
Unemploy Congressional District’s unemployment rate 0.058618 0.023330 
Medincome Median income in the Congressional district 43,405 10,916 
Pctgas Percent of housing units heated by natural gas, 
bottled gas, or kerosene 
0.57985 0.22851 
Pctoil Percent of housing units heated by heating oil 0.088790 0.15060 
Popdens Population density (people per square mile) 2,392.9 6844.1 
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Table 16—Summary Statistics for Senate Voting Analysis 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
Deviation 
voteres =1 if vote for environmental policy, 0 otherwise 0.4384358 0.4962508 
Ordvoteres =2 if vote for environmental policy, 1 if no vote 
recorded, 0 otherwise 
0.8799564 0.9801757 
Voted =1 if a vote was recorded, 0 otherwise 0.9749455 0.1563076 
Democrat =1 if a Senator is a Democrat 0.4653595 0.4988529 
Statecorn State corn production (in bushels) 1,136,674 2,172,925 
Renewpot State’s renewable potential (% of current energy 
use) 
1,814.911 4,118.877 
Tax State’s most beneficial uniform national tax 3,015.556 1,908.663 
Energy =1 if vote is classified as Energy-related, 0 
otherwise 
0.3529412 0.4779367 
Landres =1 if vote is classified as land use or resource-
related, 0 otherwise 
0.3137255 0.4640568 
Pollution =1 if vote is related to air pollution 0.1372549 0.3441537 
Envpolpro =1 if vote is related to environmental policy 
procedures 
0.0980392 0.2974001 
Water =1 if vote is classified as water-related 0.0784314 0.02688785 
Envfund =1 if vote is related to environmental funding 0.1176471 0.3222248 
Other =1 if vote does not fit into any one of the above 
categories 
0.2156863 0.4113424 
Dnomscore Legislator ideology as measured by the D-
Nominate score (higher values are more 
conservative) 
0.0316806 0.4562987 
Pviscore Ideology of the state 1.533333 8.400915 
Pcturban Percent of population that lives in urban areas 0.718179 0.1410048 
Pctblck Percent of the population that is black 0.106757 0.0959543 
Pctasian Percent of the population that is Asian 0.0212218 0.0191511 
Pcthisp Percent of the population that is Hispanic 0.797791 0.0923322 
Pctmale Percent of the population that is male 0.4907226 0.0065128 
Pctover65 Percent of the population that is over 65 0.1264884 0.0166551 
Medincome Median income in the state 41,036.62 6,287.621 
Pctgas Percent of housing units heated by natural gas, 
bottled gas, or kerosene 
0.529682 0.1815374 
Pctoil Percent of housing units heated by heating oil 0.0905853 0.1478487 
Popdens Population density (people per square mile) 173.7924 226.841 
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 Several approaches can be taken to analyze the data.  The first method used is 
random and fixed effects logit and probit models. 
 The probability of Representative j voting “pro-environmental” on issue i is  
 01
1
ijij
ij
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ij
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+
=        (4) 
where 1iju  is the structural component of utility of voting “yes” for vote i by 
Representative j and 0iju  is the utility of voting “no.”  True utility is equal to ijijij uv ε+= , 
where ijε  is an iid logit error.  Normalizing 0
0 =iju , we have 
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+
= .        (5) 
1
iju  can be decomposed as  
 jijjij Taxxu γβα +⋅+=
1 ,      (6) 
where jα  is a random effect for the Representative in question.  Separate regressions are 
run for each category of House votes. 
 However, voting for or against each bill does not exhaust the options available to 
the legislators.  Some choose not to vote.  If ignored, this could lead to a potential sample 
selection bias.  There are two main ways to overcome this issue.  First, the sample 
selection issue can be addressed directly similar to Heckman (1979) by estimating a two-
stage model with a first-stage probit selection equation to determine voting, and a second-
stage probit model of vote result.  Additional variables affecting the selection equation 
are legislator age and tenure in the House.   
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 A second way to control for non-voting behavior is to assume an ordered structure 
to the voting process (as pioneered by Deacon and Shapiro 1975).  If a legislator feels 
strongly enough about a bill, they are more likely to vote in that case.  Therefore, non-
voting is evidence of near-indifference.18
 
  Thus, we can structure the model as an ordered 
response model, with the choice variable, d, being represented by  
0=d  if 0θ<iju , 1=d  if 10 θθ ≤≤ iju , and 2=d  if 1θ>iju . (7) 
Thus, large deviations in latent utility produce pro-environmental and anti-environmental 
voting while mid-range utility represents near-indifference and non-voting.  Thus, we 
estimate ordered probit and ordered logit models, as well as non-selection models. 
Results 
Green electricity policy adoption 
 Table 17 presents the results of the green electricity policy adoption analysis.  The 
results show that constituent interest, as measured by the state’s efficient level of 
abatement as a percentage of abatement under the current sulfur dioxide trading price, is 
an important factor in the adoption of green electricity policies.  The t-statistics in both 
the logit and probit model are significant at the 5% level.  The signs are consistent with 
the hypothesis that constituent interest is a factor in the determination of these policies.  
In the case of the logit model with the state “tax” variable as the variable of interest, an 
increase in the optimal “tax” of $100 causes the probability of policy adoption to rise by 
2.5% (holding all other variables at the mean). 
                                                 
18 This logic is similar to the analysis of demand in Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro 
(1982). 
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Table 17—Results for Green Electricity Analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Logit Logit Probit Probit 
StateCorn 0.0292746 
(1.42) 
0.0289966 
(1.57) 
0.0126537 
(1.29) 
0.0134111 
(1.42) 
Renewpot 0.0130233 
(1.20) 
0.0130065 
(1.28) 
0.00551315 
(0.99) 
0.00600965 
(1.10) 
Baseline -0.0961424 
(-1.58) 
-0.10577 
(-1.80)* 
-0.0627964 
(-2.02)** 
-0.0679323 
(-2.17)** 
Pviscore -0.00409728 
(-0.06) 
0.0486498 
(0.65) 
-0.00764108 
(-0.20) 
0.0221155 
(0.55) 
pcturban 14.1867 
(1.61) 
12.5983 
(1.56) 
6.56759 
(1.57) 
6.08128 
(1.49) 
pctblack -7.75285 
(-1.54) 
-4.45032 
(-0.94) 
-4.74165 
(-1.71)* 
-2.85676 
(-1.09) 
pctasian -14.6682 
(-0.30) 
-23.617 
(-0.48) 
-3.37995 
(-0.13) 
-10.317 
(-0.39) 
pcthisp -2.12472 
(-0.40) 
1.64733 
(0.33) 
-0.957235 
(-0.35) 
1.084 
(0.40) 
pctover65 -32.0349 
(-1.19) 
-11.2267 
(-0.42) 
-17.0489 
(-1.17) 
-5.57602 
(-0.38) 
medincome -1.8484 
(-1.60) 
-1.0051 
(-0.93) 
-0.943629 
(-1.51) 
-0.498778 
(-0.82) 
pctgas -6.57793 
(-1.63) 
-6.67739 
(-1.78)* 
-3.12381 
(-1.59) 
-3.31921 
(-1.73)* 
pctelec -10.9522 
(-2.78)*** 
-11.3648 
(-3.12)*** 
-5.68476 
(-2.92)*** 
-6.13543 
(-3.23)*** 
popdens 0.00491595 
(0.95) 
0.00416562 
(0.84) 
0.00316137 
(1.16) 
0.00262724 
(0.97) 
demconu 1.26597 
(0.50) 
1.61093 
(0.62) 
0.565306 
(0.38) 
0.832319 
(0.55) 
demconl 6.4502 
(1.24) 
7.29599 
(1.38) 
3.11329 
(1.16) 
3.68575 
(1.32) 
govdem 0.689655 
(1.06) 
0.744432 
(1.19) 
0.320156 
(0.97) 
0.365985 
(1.12) 
RPS Fixed Eff.19 1.679364  -4.357587 1.398153 -1.164009 
NMRFixed Eff. 3.9805 -2.02507 2.689621 -0.794682 
PBF Fixed Eff. 1.09288 -4.94799 1.057797 -2.452328 
GDR Fixed Eff. 2.52919 -3.49793 1.85845 -1.63986 
State Tax 0.286731 
(2.36)** 
 0.158642 
(2.44)** 
 
StPctg  1.25636 
(2.53)** 
 0.729288 
(2.67)*** 
N 180 180 180 180 
t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses 
***= significant at the 1% level 
** = significant at the 5% level 
* = significant at the 10% level 
                                                 
19 Models with random effects present similar results.  Magnitudes are similar, and State 
Tax and StPctg are always significant at the 5% level. 
67 
 
 
 In addition, the policy-specific fixed effects accurately match the frequency with 
which these policies are adopted.  Net metering rules are the most popular, followed by 
generation disclosure rules, renewable portfolio standards, and public benefit funds.  We 
suspect that the relative adoption is due to the political attractiveness of the various 
policies.  Net metering transfers power to consumers, even though many will never use it; 
lobbyists for the power companies probably do not complain too much since not many 
consumers take advantage of the rule.  Generation disclosure rules impose little in the 
way of excess costs, but rather encourage the spread of information.  Renewable portfolio 
standards start to impose extra costs on the generators, and are likely to be met with 
resistance by lobbyists.  Lastly, public benefit funds impose taxes on electricity, which is 
often not politically favorable.  Variables that capture these cost effects on producers and 
consumers would probably reduce the policy-specific fixed effects to be the same, but 
that is not the focus of this analysis. 
 Political ideology, both in the government (measured by whether the governor of 
the state is a Democrat), and of the state’s citizenry (measured by the state’s Cook 
partisan voting index), is also important.  In both cases, the effect is statistically 
significant and of the expected sign.  States with Democratic governors are more likely to 
adopt green electricity policies, and states with a higher PVI score (indicating a more 
conservative ideology) are less likely to adopt.  Economic interests, especially the 
baseline emissions, also prove important.  A state with higher baseline emissions is less 
likely to mandate any of these policies, presumably because they have a greater interest 
in polluting industries.  State corn production is statistically insignificant, but of the 
expected sign.  Higher production of corn indicates a greater potential to gain from the 
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increased production of biofuels, and a positive sign would reflect this consideration.  
Renewable potential, while also statistically insignificant, is always of the correct sign, 
assuming that states with a higher potential for renewable energy generation are more 
likely to adopt these policies.   
 One interesting fact that bears mentioning is the case of North Carolina.  North 
Carolina does not have any of these four policies in place.  Rather, they have chosen to 
choose a different policy option through the Clean Smokestacks rule discussed above.  In 
this case, one might expect the residuals for North Carolina’s observations to predict 
adoption of the policies.  However, the residuals are never large enough to predict a 
positive outcome for any of the four policies.  This suggests that the Clean Smokestacks 
legislation was probably prompted by different factors than those that motivate adoption 
of the other green electricity policies.   
 These results are robust to the inclusion of other demographic variables, such as 
race, urban population and other factors.  These results are omitted, but are available 
from the author upon request. 
Congressional voting analysis 
 Table 18 presents the results of the panel logit analysis of the House of 
Representatives voting data, while Table 19 presents the same results for the Senate data.  
The columns represent each of the categories in which the votes are classified.  Separate 
regressions are estimated for each category in order to allow all coefficients to vary 
across categories.  This arrangement presents several important observations.  First, 
constituent interest as measured by the tax variable is significant in all but one category 
(environmental funding).  However, the coefficient is greatest for the categories of energy  
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Table 18—Results for House of Representatives Voting Analysis:  Panel Logit Results 
 Category of Vote 
 Energy Air 
Pollution 
Land and 
Resources 
Env. Policy Water Env. 
Funding 
Other 
 N=7164 N=3765 N=10897 N=1672 N=1248 N=1642 N=2123 
Variable        
d2003 -2.491247 
(-14.65)*** 
-3.764443 
(-13.34)*** 
-2.023152 
(-13.79)*** 
- - - - 
d2004 -2.05996 
(-12.49)*** 
-3.971373 
(-12.74)*** 
-2.028934 
(-12.66)*** 
-0.146011 
(-0.45) 
- 0.583340 
(2.24)** 
- 
d2005 -1.68966 
(-13.27)*** 
-3.7959 
(-14.25)*** 
-2.365491 
(-14.66)*** 
-0.839242 
(-2.26)** 
-1.194702 
(-6.89)*** 
 -0.130354 
(-0.75) 
d2006 -1.471825 
(-10.97)*** 
-2..770571 
(-9.45)*** 
-2.459075 
(-14.73)*** 
- 0.201229 
(1.29) 
 -0.004349 
(-0.03) 
democrat -0.735086 
(-1.48) 
-2.034854 
(-3.25)*** 
0.602696 
(1.44) 
-0.280352 
(-0.30) 
0.662606 
(1.52) 
2.906729 
(4.92)*** 
-1.794245 
(-4.20)*** 
renewpot -0.000087 
(-1.71)* 
-0.000061 
(-1.12) 
-6.39e-6 
(-0.14) 
6.09e-6 
(0.11) 
-0.000098 
(-1.67)* 
-0.000028 
(-0.44) 
-1.26e-6 
(-0.04) 
dnomscore -5.726503 
(-9.30)*** 
-8.458938 
(-10.13)*** 
-4.718558 
(-9.05)*** 
-8.925457 
(-6.19)*** 
-0.560864 
(-1.12) 
-3.398792 
(-4.48)*** 
-5.691954 
(-9.78)*** 
pviscore -0.025798 
(-2.23)** 
-0.012504 
(-0.92) 
-0.055408 
(-4.88)*** 
-0.013429 
(-0.73) 
0.001006 
(0.11) 
-0.046902 
(-2.67)*** 
-0.007192 
(-0.75) 
pcturban 1.12493 
(2.20)** 
0.864218 
(1.48) 
1.486187 
(3.11)*** 
1.240593 
(1.69)* 
1.188531 
(2.60)*** 
-0.601216 
(-1.01) 
0.636714 
(1.71)* 
tax 0.0002707 
(5.49)*** 
0.0002723 
(4.77)*** 
0.000164 
(3.46)*** 
0.0002047 
(2.36)** 
0.0001316 
(3.23)*** 
0.0000397 
(0.68) 
0.0001335 
(3.72)*** 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** = significant at the 1% level 
** = significant at the 5% level 
* = significant at the 10% level 
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 Table 19—Results for Senate Voting Analysis:  Panel Logit Results 
 Category of Vote 
 Energy Air 
Pollution 
Land and 
Resources 
Env. Policy Water Env. 
Funding 
Other 
 N=1582 N=613 N=1402 N=439 N=354 N=523 N=967 
Variable        
d2004 -0.2306538 
(-0.64) 
- 0.5577316 
(1.48) 
- - 0.737274 
(1.04) 
-0.3276303 
(-0.83) 
d2005 -0.283881 
(-1.50) 
1.763458 
(4.48)*** 
0.8643842 
(4.12)*** 
- 0.9057079 
(2.94)*** 
1.066294 
(1.18) 
0.5406193 
(1.71)* 
d2006 -1.130363 
(-4.42)*** 
- 1.052886 
(2.71)*** 
1.408014 
(4.39)*** 
- 1.824839 
(2.01)** 
2.630463 
(5.94)*** 
democrat 0.4139401 
(0.54) 
0.8897988 
(0.65) 
0.3507242 
(0.51) 
3.481172 
(3.61)*** 
0.1107816 
(0.14) 
-0.8462275 
(-0.66) 
-0.2188183 
(-0.33) 
renewpot 2.91e-6 
(0.07) 
-0.0000404 
(-0.63) 
0.000069 
(2.10)** 
8.35e-6 
(0.17) 
-0.0000156 
(-0.39) 
0.0000315 
(0.35) 
0.0000971 
(2.33)** 
dnomscore -3.605528 
(-3.72)*** 
-5.783033 
(-3.11)*** 
-4.759212 
(-5.07)*** 
0.4386523 
(0.39) 
-2.284918 
(-2.28)** 
-12.99794 
(-5.10)*** 
-7.61877 
(-7.35)*** 
pviscore -0.0914559 
(-2.56)*** 
-0.082475 
(-1.24) 
-0.0977908 
(-3.05)*** 
-0.140676 
(-2.77)*** 
-0.0283806 
(-0.93) 
0.0417753 
(0.77) 
-0.0316005 
(-1.16) 
pcturban 0.7686714 
(0.66) 
-0.0806484 
(-0.04) 
-0.0233779 
(-0.02) 
-1.130783 
(-0.79) 
2.134223 
(1.88)* 
1.842461 
(0.82) 
-1.670458 
(-1.63) 
tax 0.0001943 
(1.97)** 
0.0004983 
(2.72)*** 
-0.0000702 
(-0.82) 
0.0000661 
(0.54) 
-0.0000445 
(-0.46) 
0.0003374 
(1.75)* 
-0.0000804 
(-0.87) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** = significant at the 1% level 
** = significant at the 5% level 
* = significant at the 10% level 
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and air pollution, the two categories where theory predicts the biggest response.  In the 
case of energy-related bills, the coefficient is 0.0002707 (House of Representatives), 
which is slightly lower than the coefficient for air pollution bills, which is 0.0002723.  In 
addition, these categories show the highest t-statistics.  The effect by category ranks from 
highest effect to lowest effect as follows:  air pollution, energy, environmental policy 
procedure, land and resource policy, other policies, water policy, and environmental 
funding.  There is still a positive and significant response in the categories that are not 
directly related to our measure of constituent interest, suggesting that our measure is a 
reasonable proxy for interest in the other categories.  The results in the Senate confirm 
the House of Representatives results, showing the highest coefficient estimate for air 
pollution votes, with only energy and environmental funding showing any other 
significance.  These results confirm that although our variable can be a suitable proxy in a 
number of categories, the most adequate measures of constituent interest must be 
properly targeted to the policies in question. 
 Political variables, like the ideology of the politician (their D-Nominate score) 
and ideology of the district (Cook PVI), are also strongly significant, suggesting that 
politicians determine their voting behavior through a combination of constituent interest, 
their own ideology, and the ideology of their district.  Politicians with a higher D-
Nominate score are more conservative, and the negative coefficient on this variable 
reflects that conservatives tend not to favor environmental policies.  The Cook PVI score, 
which represents district ideology, is also positively related to with how conservative the 
district is.  Thus, the negative coefficient is expected.  After conditioning on ideology, the 
effect of party affiliation of the Representative is more sporadic.  This is consistent with 
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the findings of Anderson (2007).  Party affiliation is significant in only three cases:  air 
pollution, environmental funding, and other.  In the case of environmental funding, it is 
significantly positive and of great magnitude.  This is consistent with the fiscally liberal 
ideals of much of the Democratic Party, and when combined with a low value for the 
politician’s ideology suggests that party affiliation is more important than ideology in this 
case.  The coefficient in the case of air pollution voting is negative and significant, 
implying that Democrats, ceteris paribus, are less likely to vote for these propositions.  
However, the coefficient on Representative ideology is very high in this category, and the 
collinearity between these two variables might be leading to the seemingly odd result.  
Omitting ideology from the regression yields a positive and significant coefficient on 
Democratic affiliation. 
 More parsimonious regressions (with just political party, ideology, and 
constituent interest) as well as models with more variables (such as race, sex, 
unemployment, percentage of urban population, Representative age and tenure, and 
household heating fuel choice) were estimated, with little change in the results.  The tax 
variable continues to be most important for the energy and air pollution categories, as 
predicted.  Pooled models with interaction terms for the categories also generated similar 
results with fixed or random effects, as did models with no panel effects.  The ordered 
logit and ordered probit model results are also very similar to the panel logit results.  In 
addition, the models with selection equations showed test statistics that failed to reject the 
null hypothesis that there was no sample selection problem (in all but one category, land 
and resource policy, which is not one of the categories of interest).20
                                                 
20 These results are omitted, but are available from the author upon request. 
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 Conclusions 
 This paper has derived new measures of constituent interest in the context of air 
pollution.  This measure is obtained from a model of the U.S. electricity sector and an 
integrated assessment model of air pollution transfer and valuation.  These measures of 
constituent interest are used in two models:  state adoption of green electricity policies 
and Congressional voting on environmental issues.   
 In each case, constituent interest is shown to be an important factor in the 
determination of the choices.  In contrast to previous literature, we find that both 
constituent interest and political ideology are significant.  In the Congressional voting 
analysis, our results show the most significant effects in the categories of energy and air 
pollution.  These are the categories most directly related to our constituent interest 
variable.  This suggests that constituent interest cannot be measured by a broad, 
categorical measure, but should be tailored to the situation at hand. 
 Future studies that attempt to disentangle the effects of constituent interest, 
ideology, and demographics should carefully define a measure of constituent interest that 
is appropriate for the situation at hand.  This paper has shown that measures that the 
traditional measures are not adequate and might understate the effect of constituent 
interest.  Past studies that have not found a constituent interest effect may need to be 
reevaluated with a more appropriate measure in order to determine if constituent interest 
is a valid concern in the determination of policy.
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CHAPTER 4:  STRATEGIC INTERACTION AMONG STATES 
 The fact that emissions of harmful pollutants often cross state lines creates a 
situation where states may engage in strategic interaction.  This possibility is greatest for 
air pollution since air pollutants can often travel long distances before causing damage.  
If California releases an extra ton of sulfur dioxide, it is possible that other states will 
react in a number of different ways.  First of all, other states may emit more, feeling that 
if California emits more, it would be politically acceptable if they do as well.  
Alternatively, downwind states may decrease their emissions to reduce damages, 
compensating for California’s emissions.  Thirdly, if California’s emissions have 
increased due to some loosening of environmental regulation, other states may also lower 
their stringency in an effort to compete for mobile capital.  All of these are examples of 
strategic interaction in the specific area of air pollution.  This chapter explains which of 
these situations is the main driver of strategic interaction in environmental stringency.  
We find that, in general, tax competition explains a larger amount of competition than 
spillover competition.  Furthermore, we show that higher marginal damages from 
pollution limit competitive behavior among states. 
 Many empirical papers have found evidence that governments compete 
strategically in the formation of fiscal policies.  There are two basic models that generate 
these results:  the spillover model and the resource-flow model (Brueckner 2003).  While 
these models generate the same results, they are motivated by different assumptions.  In 
the spillover model, the assumption is that governments strategically respond to other 
governments’ policies because their policies spill over from one jurisdiction to another.  
For example, one city might spend less on park services if the adjacent city has already 
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invested in parks.  The park benefits spill over because they are available to both cities.  
Alternatively, governments might consider other governments’ policies because of 
competition to have the “best” policies.  Similarly, they might use other governments’ 
policies as a benchmark on which they base their own policies.  This type of competition 
is called spillover competition, in which yardstick competition is a specific case with 
political motivations. 
 In contrast, the resource-flow model assumes that the strategic behavior occurs 
due to competition over a fixed supply of resources.  A good example of this behavior is 
state competition in attracting industries to locate in-state (Tasto 2007).  One way that 
states accomplish this is by reducing taxes on firms, thus giving rise to the term, “tax 
competition.” 
 In the cases we have mentioned above, the source of the strategic interaction is 
fairly clear.  However, in many cases, both spillover competition and tax competition 
might be driving the results.  The stringency of environmental regulation is one of these 
cases.  Elements of both spillover models and resource-flow models are present in the 
case of strategic interaction in environmental stringency as described in the introductory 
paragraph to this chapter.   
 Fredrikkson and Millimet (2002) find evidence that states react strategically to 
other states’ environmental stringency, but they are unable to disentangle the effects of 
spillover and tax competition.  We propose a method for distinguishing between the two 
types of competition.  All strategic interaction models use weighting matrices to model 
the pattern of interaction among states.  We exploit this aspect of the models by 
specifying two different weighting matrices:  one that corresponds to spillovers and one 
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that represents tax competition.  Previous papers (e.g., Fredriksson and Millimet 2002) 
state that the ideal weighting matrix for spillover competition would account for state-to-
state pollution flows.  We construct this weighting matrix using TAF’s source-receptor 
matrix.  Since tax competition focuses on competition between states for mobile capital, 
it is presumed that this competition will occur between states with similar industrial 
structure.  Thus, we use a weighting matrix based on Crone’s (1999) classification of 
states into regions defined over industrial composition.  We estimate the model with each 
weighting matrix and compare the results with those resulting from the more traditional 
contiguity-based weighting matrix.   
 Secondly, we examine whether increased damage from pollution changes a state’s 
strategic response to other state’s policies.  If a state is subject to higher marginal 
damages from pollution, then that state should be less likely to engage in a race-to-the-
bottom.  However, higher damages would be unlikely to change a state’s behavior in 
upward competition.  We use the within-state marginal damages estimated in Chapter 2 
interacted with the strategic response to test for these effects.   
 Section 2 reviews the literature on these models and previous attempts to 
disentangle the two forms of competition.  Section 3 presents the econometric model used 
to test the hypothesis.  Section 4 discusses the methodology of the two tests and the data 
used in the analysis.  Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.   
Literature Review 
 The seminal paper in the empirical literature on strategic interactions in policy-
making is Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993).  They test whether states’ budgets are 
influenced by their “neighbors,” which is not necessarily defined by contiguity (which 
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states are directly adjacent), but may also be determined by varying degrees of similarity.  
The authors set up a theoretical model of strategic policy-making, which supports their 
assertion that states respond to the policies of other states.   
 Case, Hines, and Rosen specify three options for the weighting matrix used to 
determine which other states are a state’s “neighbors”:  matrices based on contiguity, 
similar income, and similar racial composition.  They estimate the model with each 
weighting matrix, and note that the highest log-likelihood reflects the best weighting 
matrix.  They find that the log-likelihood is maximized when using the weighting matrix 
based on racial composition.  In addition, they perform tests using linear combinations of 
the matrices and find that the racial composition weighting matrix is dominant.  All of the 
weighting matrices show evidence of strategic interaction.  The authors, in an attempt to 
deflect possible criticism that there is some inherent trick to the weighting matrix process 
that generates positive results, construct an absurd weighting matrix and run the model.  
No strategic interaction is found.  They also break down state spending by categories, but 
omit the category on environmental spending. 
 The class of model specified in Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993) is referred to as a 
“spillover model” by Brueckner (2003).  Brueckner specifies two kinds of strategic 
interaction models:  the spillover model, and the resource-flow model.  Although based 
on different theoretical models, both models result in reaction functions that are estimated 
identically.  However, the spillover model can explain spillover and yardstick 
competition, while resource-flow models focus on tax competition.   
 Other examples of spillover-type models include Murdoch, Rahmatian, and 
Thayer (1993), who examine the case of spillovers in city-level recreation expenditures 
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(if one city invests in particularly attractive parks, nearby cities may attempt to free-ride).  
Kelejian and Robinson (1993) test a similar situation with spillovers in county-level 
police expenditures.  Environmental spillover models also fall into this category 
(Murdoch, Sandler, and Sargent 1997; Fredriksson and Millimet 2002).  Besley and Case 
(1995) present a model directly based on yardstick competition, noting that constituents 
may look at the taxes and expenditures of nearby jurisdictions to determine the efficacy 
of their own government when it comes time for reelection.  Bivand and Szymanski 
(1997; 2000) estimate reaction functions for local garbage collection costs in Britain.   
 Resource-flow models generate reaction functions based on the assumption that 
many jurisdictions are competing for a fixed amount of mobile capital.  In order to attract 
capital, the jurisdictions lower their taxes, reduce environmental stringency, or otherwise 
compete to make their jurisdiction more appealing to the mobile capital.  The standard 
theoretical papers on environmental federalism fit into this category of models (Oates and 
Schwab 1988; Wellisch 1995; Markusen, Morey, and Olewiler 1995; Levinson 1997; 
Kunce and Shogren 2002, 2005, 2007; Glazer 1999; Djikstra 2003; Kunce 2004; 
Roelfsema 2007).  Additional resource-flow models (tax competition models) include 
Brett and Pinkse (2000), who focus on property tax competition; Buettner (2001), who 
looks at local business taxes in Germany; and Hayashi and Boadway (2001), who look at 
provincial corporate income taxes in Canada.  In addition, country analyses of local tax 
choices have been conducted for the U.S., Belgium, and the U.K. by Ladd (1992), 
Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), and Revelli (2001, 2002) respectively. 
 Since both the spillover model and the resource-flow model (Brueckner 2003) 
generate reaction functions, it is possible that both tax competition and spillover 
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competition are in effect.  One weakness of all of these papers is that they are unable to 
distinguish between the two effects.  Some papers have attempted to reinforce the results 
they obtained by estimating some of the structural equations from the theoretical models 
that generate the reaction function (Besley and Case 1995; Brett and Pinkse 2000).  
However, these papers only highlight why their reason is the effective reason; they do not 
explicitly model both sources and attempt to disentangle the effects.   
 Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) analyze whether environmental stringency, as 
measured by pollution abatement cost per unit of emissions or the Levinson (2001) index 
of environmental compliance costs, is strategically determined across states.  This 
situation allows for both tax competition and spillover competition.  Several important 
issues arise when considering environmental policy issues in this context.  One such issue 
is the choice of the weighting matrix.  Fredriksson and Millimet use a weighting matrix 
based on population and income, noting that they are important determinants of state 
emissions of harmful pollutants.  However, they note in a footnote that the ideal 
weighting matrix in this case would be one that assigned weights according to air 
pollution transfers.  For example, a state would weight most highly the states that spill the 
most pollution into their borders.  Their income/population matrix is supposed to proxy 
for this.  However, we have the benefit of having TAF’s source/receptor matrices.  We 
can therefore construct a weighting matrix based on actual pollution transmission.   
 Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) also estimate the model with asymmetric 
transmission.  Low-stringency states may react to the policies of high-stringency states, 
but not vice-versa.  They also use panel data to determine how long the lag is in the 
strategic interaction.  They find that the lag takes place in two to five years.   
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Empirical Model 
 Theoretical models of spillover competition and tax competition abound in the 
literature beginning with Oates and Schwab (1988).  Many of these models predict a 
“race-to-the-bottom,” while some predict a “race-to-the-top.”  However, both classes of 
models involve strategic interaction.   
 The interactions are captured in strategic response functions.  The standard form 
for these response functions is 
 ittijt
n
j
ijitit uhfEwXE ++++= ∑
=1
φβ ,    (8) 
where itE  represents the stringency of environmental policy of state i in year t, itX  is a 
vector of demographic, political, and/or social variables, if  is a state-level fixed effect, 
th  is a time dummy, and itu  is a random error.  Other states’ policies enter the reaction 
function as a weighted average, where the weights ijw  are determined beforehand and are 
assumed exogenous.  The parameter of interest is φ :  if 0=φ , then there is no evidence 
of strategic interaction.   
 Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993) discuss one of the econometric difficulties in 
estimating these models.  Some states’ policies may be correlated due to correlated 
random shocks.  If one state experiences a random shock to their environmental 
enforcement, due to a change in economic conditions for example, it is likely that their 
neighbors (whether geographic or socioeconomic) experience similar shocks.  Thus, OLS 
estimation of the reaction functions is likely to show a positive value for φ  even if all 
correlation is due to random error.  These correlated errors are an example of spatial error 
dependence (Anselin 1988).   
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 Several other econometric issues have arisen in the literature.  First of all, the 
policy variables are always endogenous by assumption.  Since the policies are jointly 
determined (by strategic interaction), the weighted linear combination of policy variables 
that appears on the right-hand side of the equation is correlated with the error term.  To 
get around this issue, some papers estimate a reduced-form rearrangement of the model 
that must be estimated through non-linear maximum likelihood methods (Case, Hines, 
and Rosen 1993; Murdoch, Rahmatian, and Thayer 1993; Besley and Case 1995; Bivand 
and Szymanski 1997, 2000; Murdoch, Sandler, and Sargent 1999).  In effect, the model is 
inverted so that the offending variables are removed from the right hand side of the 
equation. 
 A second method to counteract this endogeneity is to use instrumental variables.  
The weighted averages of the policies are regressed on the weighted values of the other 
dependent variables (or a subset of these variables) and the fitted values are then used as 
instruments.  Additionally, one may use higher orders of the weighting matrix to 
construct additional instruments; for example, XW 2  or XW 3 .  Kelejian and Prucha 
(1998) show that the instrumental variables approach produces unbiased estimates even 
in the presence of spatial error dependence.  In addition, some papers avoid the 
endogeneity issue entirely by assuming that policy responses occur with a lag, so that 
lagged values are used for the weighted average (see, for example, Fredriksson and 
Millimet 2002).  
 Another econometric problem may exist if there are correlations between the 
jurisdictional attributes and the error term.  This results if households sort endogenously 
across communities.  For example, households with unobserved tastes for environmental 
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control and with higher income may both sort into stringent control states, biasing the 
estimated effect of income.  Such “Tiebout bias” was first pointed out by Goldstein and 
Pauly (1981) and is a special case of selection bias.  While one option is to instrument for 
the offending variables, a better option is to use panel data and to estimate jurisdiction 
level fixed effects.  This solution assumes changes in itu  are uncorrelated with changes in 
itx , but accounts for any correlation in levels. 
Data and Methodology 
 In contrast to previous work, this chapter uses distinct weighting matrices to 
capture both tax competition and spillover competition.  For the case of tax competition, 
we use a weighting matrix based on industry composition as defined in Crone (1999).  
Crone uses cluster analysis to define regions by economic activity in different sectors.  
This is ideal for specifying tax competition given the hypothesis that states compete to 
attract industry.  Thus, their main competitors should be those states who have similar 
industrial structure.  Crone regions are shown in Figure 11.  Since these regions are not 
based on  
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Figure 11—Crone Regions 
 
As defined in Crone (1999).
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contiguity or any sort of pollution flows, the reactions among states in a region should be 
mostly independent of spillover effects. 
 For the case of spillover competition, we use the source-receptor matrix from the 
Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF) model (Bloyd et al. 1996).  This matrix is 
based on actual pollution spillovers from state to state, as defined by the Ambient Source  
Trajectory Regional Air Pollution (ASTRAP) model, which is based on eleven years of 
meteorological data and has been validated by historical emissions data.  Once the 
source-receptor matrix is extracted from TAF, it needs to be calibrated with pollution 
levels.  We use EPA data on sulfur dioxide emissions from 1976 to calibrate the 
weighting matrix.  This year is used since it is the year before the range of independent 
variables, thus avoiding endogeneity of the weighting matrix elements.  In the final 
matrix, each state assigns a weight to a neighbor based on the percentage of its damages 
that are caused by that neighbor.  These weighting matrix specifications are compared to 
the baseline case, which uses the standard contiguity matrix.   
 As in Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), our dependent variables are the Levinson 
index as discussed in Levinson (2001) and unadjusted pollution abatement and control 
expenditures (PACE) per dollar of state manufacturing output for the years 1977-1994, 
excluding 1987.21
                                                 
21 Levinson Index data is not available for 1987. 
  The Levinson index compares actual pollution abatement costs to the 
predicted abatement costs for each state.  The predicted abatement costs are based on 
national abatement expenditure by industry and the individual state’s industrial 
composition.  Thus, a value less than one implies that the state’s abatement costs are 
lower than what would be expected of a state with that industrial composition, while a  
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Table 20—Summary Statistics for Strategic Interaction 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Index Levinson’s index of environmental stringency 
(2001) 
1.022371 0.3589778 
PACE Per capita abatement cost of emissions 0.0076315 0.0162409 
Pcinc Per capita income $14,336.95 2,387.18 
Pcsq Per capita income squared 2.11 x 108 7.25 x 107 
Pccube Per capita income cubed 3.20 x 1012 1.72 x 1012 
Popd Population density (people per square mile) 59.11087 79.84464 
Urb Percent of population that lives in an urban area 0.673099 0.133909 
MD Within-state marginal damages from sulfur 
dioxide pollution (as derived in Chapter 2) 
589.04 792.98 
 
value greater than one indicates higher than expected costs.  The Levinson index can be 
thought of as PACE per unit of manufacturing scaled to eliminate differences across 
states due to manufacturing size and composition. 
 Explanatory variables include state per-capita income, per-capita income squared, 
per-capita income cubed, population density, and urbanicity.  Table 20 displays  
summary statistics for this data.  We use the IV approach to estimate simultaneous 
models, with weighted values of these variables as the instruments.22
 Additionally, we test for the effects of heterogeneous marginal damages of 
pollution on competition.  States that experience higher marginal damages from air 
pollution may be less likely to participate in downward competition (the race-to-the-
bottom) because  
  We also estimate 
models with 1, 2, and 5-year lags to examine the timing effects.   
engaging in the “race” would endanger the health of the state’s population.  Empirically, 
we specify the interaction by 
                                                 
22 I use 1st, 2nd, and 3rd orders of the weighting matrices to construct instruments. 
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where MDi is the state-specific measure of within-state marginal damages as derived in 
Chapter 2.  A value of 0>θ  implies that higher marginal damages induce higher 
competition, while 0<θ  implies the opposite.  We additionally estimate an equation of 
the form 
ittijt
n
j
ijiljt
n
j
ijihjt
n
j
ijitit uhfEwLowEwHighEwXE +++⋅⋅+⋅⋅++= ∑∑∑
=== 111
θθφβ , (10) 
where High and Low are dummy variables indicating if state i is one of the fifteen states 
with the highest marginal damages or the fifteen with the lowest marginal damages.  This 
allows the separation of the strategic interaction by high and low damage states. 
Results 
 Table 21 shows the first attempts to disentangle the effects of spillover and tax 
competition.  This model incorporates interactions without a lag, and uses the IV 
approach.  The parameters reflect the estimated value of φ  using the specified weighting 
matrix for the dependent variable shown in the column heading.  The coefficients for the 
Levinson Index estimations show that there is higher strategic interaction among 
neighbors in Crone regions than there is among neighbors in the TAF specification 
(although the coefficients are not statistically different).  This implies that tax 
competition may be a larger source of strategic interaction than spillover competition.  
For the case of PACE, the effects are reversed.  The weighting matrix based on pollution 
flows shows a higher coefficient than the Crone region specification.  The difference is 
likely due to the nature of the two dependent variables.  The Levinson Index accounts for  
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Table 21—Estimates of Strategic Interaction (IV Approach)  
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Variable Weighting Matrix 
TAF Crone Contiguity 
Levinson Index Strategic 
Interaction 
0.9143286 
(17.24)*** 
0.9710324 
(13.34)*** 
0.8614535 
(12.50)*** 
Per-Capita 
Income 
0.0000694 
(0.30) 
-0.0000172 
(-0.07) 
0.0000168 
(0.07) 
Income 
Squared 
-0.9441298 
(-0.63) 
-0.2795516 
(-0.17) 
-0.7587819 
(-0.48) 
Income Cubed 0.3056314 
(0.97) 
0.169455 
(0.49) 
0.2659303 
(0.79) 
Population 
Density 
-0.0074925 
(-2.31)** 
-0.0095825 
(-2.70)*** 
-0.002132 
(-0.60) 
Urbanicity 2.192758 
(2.73)*** 
2.620154 
(2.95)*** 
0.9804533 
(1.16) 
n 810 810 810 
R2 0.1055 0.0591 0.2718 
PACE Strategic 
Interaction 
0.8634168 
(3.13)*** 
0.7997279 
(3.65)*** 
0.5991041 
(2.94)*** 
Per-Capita 
Income 
1.06e-7 
(0.01) 
0.0000197 
(1.33) 
-4.39e-6 
(-0.31) 
Income 
Squared 
-0.0074593 
(-0.08) 
-0.1228391 
(-1.30) 
0.0162494 
(0.18) 
Income Cubed 0.0014114 
(0.08) 
0.0233394 
(1.17) 
-0.0029777 
(-0.16) 
Population 
Density 
-0.0000607 
(-0.30) 
-0.0000801 
(-0.40) 
-0.0000978 
(-0.49) 
Urbanicity 0.0298987 
(0.58) 
0.0364387 
(0.70) 
-0.0088306 
(-0.18) 
n 810 810 810 
R2 0.0944 0.0749 0.0855 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
All regressions use 1st, 2nd, and 3rd order weighted values of the five independent 
variables as instruments. 
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sectoral makeup while PACE does not, and it is likely that this affects the results for the 
Crone region specification.  Both specifications show more interaction than the 
estimation based on the traditional contiguity matrix, which is expected since contiguity 
is not expected to predict either form of competition, but would rather pick up other 
spatial elements.   
 The first stage results show that the instruments are valid, with 2R  values 
generally around 0.75 within groups and 0.15 overall.23
 Tables 22 through 24 shows the model estimated with a one, two, and five year 
lags on the policy variables, eliminating the need for the IV approach.  In the one year lag 
model (Table 22) none of the coefficients is significant for the Levinson index, while all 
are negative and significant for PACE.  This suggests that PACE, which does not account 
for sectoral changes, is picking up some time effects that may be industry specific.  The 
Levinson index accounts for these factors.  If this is not the case, then the negative 
coefficients on the lagged variable given the simultaneous results suggests that there is a 
large positive effect initially, but that the effect is dampened in the next year.  The results 
are very similar for the two and five year lags (Tables 23 and 24), except that the effect 
seems to fade around the fifth year.  This suggests that a distributed lag model may be 
appropriate in future research. 
  Tests for overidentification show 
that the instruments do not belong in the second-stage estimation with only a few 
exceptions, noted at the end of this section.  F-tests confirm that the instruments are 
jointly significant in all specifications. 
 
                                                 
23 Thus, the regressions explain 75% of the variance within each group (state), and 15% 
of the overall variance (both within and among groups). 
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Table 22—Estimates of Strategic Interaction (1-Year Lag)  
 Independent Variable 
Weighting Matrix  Levinson index PACE 
Contiguity -0.1047067 -0.2303505 
 (-1.43) (-2.56)** 
TAF (Spillover Comp.) -0.1579506 -1.041319 
 (-0.94) (-4.00)*** 
Crone (Tax Comp.) -0.1382775 -0.2234062 
 (-1.37) (-1.79)* 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*: significant at the 10% level 
**: significant at the 5% level 
***: significant at the 1% level 
Table 23—Estimates of Strategic Interaction (2-Year Lag)  
 Independent Variable 
Weighting Matrix  Levinson index PACE 
Contiguity -0.0024783 -0.2747746 
 (-0.05) (-4.42)*** 
TAF (Spillover Comp.) -0.0006779 -0.8391646 
 (-0.01) (-4.79)*** 
Crone (Tax Comp.) -0.0357744 -0.189523 
 (-0.54) (-1.79)* 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*: significant at the 10% level 
**: significant at the 5% level 
***: significant at the 1% level 
Table 24—Estimates of Strategic Interaction (5-Year Lag)  
 Independent Variable 
Weighting Matrix  Levinson index PACE 
Contiguity 0.0029892 -0.0808906 
 (0.37) (-3.74)*** 
TAF (Spillover Comp.) 0.0081051 -0.1952533 
 (0.51) (-3.73)*** 
Crone (Tax Comp.) 0.0017595 0.020858 
 (0.15) (0.50) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*: significant at the 10% level 
**: significant at the 5% level 
***: significant at the 1% level 
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Table 25—Effects of Marginal Damages 
Dependent 
Variable 
Weighting 
Scheme 
Base 
Model 
MD Interaction High State/Low State Interaction 
φ φ Interaction φ High Low 
Index TAF-EPA 0.9143286 
(17.24)*** 
0.9384592 
(16.63)*** 
-0.000045 
(-1.12) 
0.717100 
(0.71) 
0.850428 
(1.16) 
3.110782 
(4.04)*** 
Index Crone 0.9710324 
(13.34)*** 
0.9824279 
(13.46)*** 
-0.000023 
(-0.49) 
0.172186 
(0.36) 
-0.30638 
(-0.54) 
1.403221 
(2.50)** 
PACE TAF-EPA 0.8634168 
(3.13)*** 
0.9264182 
(3.42)*** 
-0.000135 
(-1.59) 
0.112627 
(0.31) 
0.760936 
(3.75)*** 
0.659730 
(3.78)*** 
PACE Crone 0.7997279 
(3.65)*** 
0.8904973 
(4.14)*** 
-0.000133 
(-1.60) 
0.162246 
(0.70) 
0.803901 
(3.85)*** 
0.785255 
(4.12)*** 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*: significant at the 10% level 
**: significant at the 5% level 
***: significant at the 1% level 
 
 Table 25 presents the results of the marginal damage effects.  The columns show 
the estimates of the strategic interaction (φ ), the effects of marginal damages (θ ), and a 
specification using dummy variables for high marginal damage and low marginal damage 
states.  The base model does not include marginal damages and is provided for reference.  
The MD interaction model, which adds the interaction term with the state-level marginal 
damages and the policy variable, shows that higher marginal damages lower the level of 
strategic interaction, although these results are slightly less than significant at the 10% 
level.  F-tests confirm that the marginal damage interaction and the strategic interaction 
are jointly significant.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that states do not engage in 
as much strategic interaction when the effects may be more harmful to their citizens.  In 
specifications with dummy variables for the fifteen states with the highest marginal 
damages and the 15 states with the lowest marginal damages, the low damage states 
compete much more when using the Levinson index.  For the case of PACE, both high 
and low marginal damage states compete more than the mid-range states.  This is a 
potentially troublesome result, but it might be the case that low marginal damage states 
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are competing with downward pressure (race to the bottom) while high marginal damage 
states are competing upward (race to the top).  In both cases, the coefficient would be 
positive.  It will be more illustrative to estimate the model with asymmetric effects to 
separate upward and downward competition. 
 Table 26 presents the results of the marginal damage analysis with asymmetric 
effects.  The “up” and “down” subscripts refer to the estimates when a states’ neighbors 
have higher or lower stringency respectively while the “high” and “low” labels still refer 
to high or low marginal damages.  First of all, the base model with asymmetric 
transmission shows that, in general, competition is stronger when a states’ neighbors have 
lower standards than it does.  However, there is still upward competition present.  When 
the MD interaction terms are added in the next set of columns, it is shown that the 
coefficients are typically larger in magnitude and statistically stronger in the case of 
downward competition than upward competition.  This shows that marginal damages 
limit the race to the bottom, while not affecting the race to the top.  When looking at the 
last set of columns for the high/low state interactions, a number of interesting trends 
emerge.  Low marginal damage states compete downwardly more than high marginal 
damage states, suggesting that the marginal damages again limit the race to the bottom.  
Low marginal damage states also compete more in the upward direction, but this is 
probably due to the fact that high marginal damage states are presumably already in the 
inelastic area of their marginal cost of abatement curve (see Figure 6 for an example) and 
therefore face higher costs of upward competition. 
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Table 26—Effects of Marginal Damages with Asymmetric Transmission 
Dependent 
Variable 
Weighting 
Scheme 
Base Model MD Interaction High State/Low State Interaction 
φup φdown φup φdown MDup MDdown φup φdown Highup Highdown Lowup Lowdown 
Index TAF-EPA 1.574172 
(1.70)* 
1.858376 
(1.83)* 
1.865855 
(1.86)* 
2.08035 
(1.94)* 
-0.000541 
(-1.24) 
-0.000636 
(-1.49) 
0.654315 
(0.65) 
0.655276 
(0.59) 
0.921377 
(1.24) 
0.946562 
(1.18) 
2.931972 
(3.72)*** 
3.24818 
(4.05)*** 
Index Crone 0.649416 
(2.10)** 
0.626347 
(1.55) 
0.676649 
(1.97)** 
0.701024 
(1.61) 
-0.000057 
(-0.21) 
-0.000177 
(-0.52) 
0.128198 
(0.26) 
0.380990 
(0.69) 
-0.203053 
(-0.36) 
-0.823781 
(-1.30) 
1.487952 
(2.63)*** 
1.090929 
(1.77)* 
PACE TAF-EPA 0.563442 
(1.78)* 
4.142766 
(6.63)*** 
0.723718 
(2.23)** 
5.460112 
(7.31)*** 
0.0000301 
(0.19) 
-0.000837 
(-2.80)*** 
-0.003678 
(-0.01) 
3.120166 
(3.30)*** 
0.649473 
(2.24)** 
0.479239 
(0.51) 
0.446529 
(1.7)* 
1.102142 
(1.11) 
PACE Crone 0.643524 
(2.96)*** 
2.991 
(2.54)** 
0.749778 
(3.28)*** 
3.253464 
(2.68)*** 
-0.000224 
(-1.40) 
0.000069 
(0.12) 
-0.222411 
(-0.70) 
2.686366 
(2.00)** 
0.650551 
(2.04)** 
1.563253 
(1.46) 
1.195834 
(3.97)*** 
-1.15244 
(-1.15) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*: significant at the 10% level 
**: significant at the 5% level 
***: significant at the 1% level 
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 However, it must be noted that all of these results should be taken with slight 
suspicion.  As is customary in analyses of this type, a weighting matrix with no 
theoretical basis was tested to look for some inherent process that biases the results 
toward significance as discussed in Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993).  An alphabetically 
based weighting matrix returned significant estimates of strategic interaction.  It is 
possible that there is some strong source of spatial correlation that has not been accounted 
for in this model.  However, tests for overidentification show that models using the 
nonsense weighting matrix use instruments that actually belong in the second-stage 
estimation.24
Conclusions 
  Thus, it is more likely that there is some random process attached to the 
alphabetical weighting matrix that causes the weighted values of the X variables to 
become significantly correlated with the dependent variables.  When these instruments 
are removed from the nonsense estimation, the results are no longer significant. 
 Strategic interaction in environmental stringency can take any of a myriad of 
forms.  The spillover model shows that environmental stringency by be affected by 
spillover competition, and the resource-flow model implies that tax competition may 
come into effect.  It is also likely that both are present in varying degrees.  Using ideally 
specified weighting matrices, we have shown that tax competition may have a stronger 
effect than spillover competition.  In addition, we find that there is not consistent 
evidence that there are any lagged effects in the interaction, and that there is no large 
difference between tax competition and spillover competition in this case. 
                                                 
24 Models using the other three weighting matrices are not overidentified. 
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 Furthermore, we show that strategic interaction among the states is tempered by 
the effect of marginal damages.  States with higher marginal damages of pollution are 
less likely to compete as much.  Asymmetric results confirm that this mainly affects the 
race to the bottom and not the race to the top. 
 Some slight suspicion is warranted due to the problems with the nonsense 
weighting matrix.  However, further testing implies that the problem lies with that 
weighting matrix and not with the overall results. 
 Future work will focus this strategic interaction into the area of renewable energy 
funding.  Renewable energy is a complicated case, as tax competition is influenced by the 
creation of “green” jobs and the potential loss of jobs and tax revenue from conventional 
sources.  Spillover competition is also present for a number of reasons.  First of all, 
renewable energy sources cause fewer emissions of harmful pollutants, leading to 
spillover effects as discussed above.  However, there is also a spillover effect in the sense 
that electricity generated from renewable sources is often sold on the grid, and may not 
stay in the state where it was generated.  The specifications introduced in this chapter as a 
means of disentangling the types of competition present are valid in a number of areas, 
and future research will exploit this technique.
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSIONS 
 This dissertation presents answers to several important questions related to the 
interplay of state and federal environmental policies.  Chapter 2 analyzes a potential 
conundrum in the environmental federalism literature.  Political limitations limit the 
applicability of the optimal solution to interjurisdictional air pollution, leaving 
policymakers with a choice between two suboptimal options.  State-determined policies 
can account for state specific differences in willingness to pay for benefits and the cost of 
pollution abatement, but are likely to ignore interstate spillovers of air pollution.  Federal 
policies are likely to be uniform, which allows control of spillovers, but cannot account 
for heterogeneity in costs and damages.  This work finds that the uniform federal policy 
comes much closer to the optimal policy for both sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides.  
Furthermore, the uniform policy captures over 99% of the benefits provided by the 
optimal policy for sulfur dioxide.   
 This work has important implications for policy.  First, national uniform policies, 
such as a national cap-and-trade system or national uniform pollution tax are likely to be 
very efficient alternatives to the politically unrealistic optimal policy.  Second, while 
recent regulations (like CAIR) have focused on regional cap-and-trade systems in order 
to allow for heterogeneity by region, regional markets are unlikely to be superior to a 
federal uniform system, especially if there are economies of scale in the administration of 
these programs.  With over 99% of the benefits already captured, a regional system 
simply will not result in a large enough change in benefits to justify the added cost.  
Furthermore, regional systems like CAIR, which focus on East/West divisions, would 
likely cause a decrease in efficiency due to increased emissions in Western states. 
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 Chapter 3 explains the influence of constituent interest on the formation of policy.  
In previous studies, constituent interest is measured by environmental interest group 
membership or other demographic variables.  Demographic variables likely have their 
own effects and are not good proxies for constituent interest.  Environmental group 
membership and other similar measures are narrowly focused are likely to be 
substantially correlated with ideology measures, making separation of the effects 
difficult.  My measure is based on actual costs and benefits of air pollution, and 
represents the policy that is in the best interest of the health of the state population.  We 
derive two measures for use in two analyses.  First, we use within-state marginal damages 
of pollution as a measure of constituent interest in explaining which states adopt green 
electricity policies.  Unlike previous studies, we find that constituent interest has a 
significant effect.  Second, we use each state’s most beneficial national uniform policy as 
a measure of constituent interest in analyzing federal legislative voting on environmental 
issues.  Again, we find that constituent interest is an important predictor of environmental 
voting, particularly in the cases that are most related to our measure. 
 Chapter 3 adds to the literature in a number of ways.  It proposes a new measure 
of constituent interest that takes a different perspective than previous measures.  This 
measure is broadly based and conforms to economic theory.  It shows that constituent 
interest in this form is a significant factor in determining economic policy.  Secondly, 
splitting the legislative votes into categories shows that the constituent interest variable is 
greatest in magnitude and significance in the categories of energy and air pollution, 
suggesting that constituent interest measures are highly contextual.  Otherwise, the 
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effects of constituent interest may be understated due to measurement error.  This is an 
important implication for all studies of the determinants of policy. 
 Chapter 4 examines the case of strategic interaction in environmental policy.  
Two different scenarios of competition can explain strategic interaction in environmental 
stringency, but previous literature has been unable to disentangle these effects.  Tax 
competition predicts that states act strategically when deciding environmental policy in 
order to attract industry to the state, as in the so-called “race to the bottom.”  Spillover 
competition is based on spillover effects, and reflects the desire of states to respond to the 
emissions of their neighbors, which may transcend jurisdictional borders.  We use ideal 
weighting matrices for each type of competition to analyze the differing effects of the 
selection of neighbors.  My results show that the tax competition weighting matrix 
reveals a higher level of competition than the spillover competition weighting matrix, 
although the estimates are not statistically different from each other.  This implies that tax 
competition may be the stronger force overall.   
 Chapter 4 also uses the within-state marginal damages from Chapters 2 and 3 to 
explain the effects of marginal damages on competitive behavior.  We find evidence that 
states with higher marginal damages limit competitive behavior.  This effect is 
asymmetric, with marginal damages limiting downward competition while having no 
effect on upward competition.   
 While the analysis of Chapter 4 has many important contributions and 
implications, it is necessary to note that these results come with some minor caveats.  
Additional regressions using a nonsense weighting matrix show significant results, which 
implies that there is some source of persistent spatial correlation among states that the 
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model does not capture.  However, further testing confirmed that overidentification was 
the source of the problem with the estimates based on the nonsense weighting matrix. 
 While this dissertation has contributed to the literature on environmental policy 
and answered some important questions, it has also posed a number of new questions.  
The analysis of environmental federalism in Chapter 2 analyzes sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxide in a partial equilibrium framework, with each pollutant addressed 
individually.  In order to inform policy in a more applicable way, these pollutants should 
be addressed simultaneously in a general equilibrium framework.  If there are substantial 
interactions between sulfur dioxide emissions and nitrogen oxide emissions (if they are 
substitutes or complements in production), then the partial equilibrium analysis will not 
be sufficient.  Future work will search for the optimal policies given the interactions 
between the two pollutants. 
 Additionally, the analysis in Chapter 2-3 assumed that the transmission of 
pollution from state to state is fixed, while in the real world it is subject to change.  By 
strategically locating polluting firms on the borders of the state, state governments can 
partially control how much of the pollution damages are suffered within state and how 
much is “exported” to other states.  Future research will calculate this mix of within-state 
damages and out of state damages to test whether plants in border locations 
systematically pollute more than non-border plants. 
 The constituent interest variables used in Chapter 3 would be widely applicable in 
a number of political economy studies of environmental regulation.  They are valuable 
not only as a measure of constituent interest, but also as the raw marginal damages each 
state experiences.   
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 The future of Chapter 4 will more completely examine what factors influence 
strategic competition among the states.  We also intend to examine the case of strategic 
interaction among states in the funding of renewable energy programs and renewable 
energy standards.   
 This dissertation has contributed to the environmental economics literature with 
its analyses of environmental federalism, constituent interest, and strategic interaction.  
Like all worthwhile research projects, these studies have answered some questions while 
posing more.  The work contained in this dissertation is only the beginning of a much 
longer research agenda.
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